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PURCHASE,-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
IN LAND IN MISSOURI
GRANT S. NELSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
If the number of reported cases is an accurate indication,' Missouri
courts and lawyers are often confronted by countless variations and
complications of the following basic fact situation: A conveys land to B
by means of a standard deed form containing a recitation of consideration
paid by B, but in fact the purchase price was paid by a third party, C.
This transaction, of course, should normally raise in the mind of the
reader the possible application of the oft-used remedy of the purchase-money
resulting trust. In view of the importance of this remedy to Missouri
lawyers, it is the purpose of this article to analyze the application in a real
estate setting of the purchase-money resulting trust by Missouri appellate
courts.2 Because meaningful examination of the remedy is aided immensely
by the presence of relevant fact situations, the facts of recent and, hope-
fully, instructive Missouri cases are emphasized wherever possible.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. 28 Mo. Dig. indicates that there have been well over 200 Missouri ap-
pellate decisions, each dealing with some aspect of purchase-money resulting trusts
in real estate.
2. A short, but helpful and analytical student comment on certain aspects
of the problem in Missouri may be found in McMullin, Purchase:Money Resulting
Trusts in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv. 354 (1941). For general coverage of the problem
see G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 454-457 (2d Ed. 1964); 5 A.
Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 440-460 (3d ed. 1967); Scott, Resulting Trusts Arising Upon thre
Purchase of Land, 40 HAnv. L. REv. 669 (1927). It is helpful at the outset to distin-
guish between express, resulting, and constructive trusts. Both express trusts and re-
sulting trusts are concerned with the intention of the creating parties. The express
trust is created only where by words the settlor manifests an intention to create
it, whereas the resulting trust arises where circumstances justify an inference or
presumption that the settlor did not intend that the person holding title have
the beneficial interest therein. The constructive trust is a remedial device imposed
not to recognize intention but to prevent unjust enrichment and to redress wrong.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 1, comment e (1959). See also text at
notes 217 through 254 infra. There are three situations in which a resulting trust
properly arises: "(1) where an express trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where an
express trust is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; (3) where
property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his
direction the vendor conveys the property to another person." 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS
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II. GENERAL DisCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINE
Missouri and most other American jurisdictions recognize the long-
established rule that where one person pays the purchase price of land
but the legal title is conveyed to another, a presumption normally is cre-
ated that the latter person holds the land under a resulting trust for the
party paying the purchase price.3 The underlying theory of the rule is
grounded in the assumption that normally a person who provides purchase
money intends to receive the benefit of the purchase; in other words, the
purchase-money resulting trust is "intent enforcing." 4 The fact that the
deed recitals refer to consideration having been paid by the grantee and
that there is a statement that the conveyance is for the use of the grantee
will not foreclose the presumption of resulting trust in the absence of
evidence showing that such trust was not intended.5 A resulting trust
may be enforced not only by the beneficiary, but also by creditors of
the payor.6 Parol evidence is clearly admissible to establish the elements
of a purchase-money resulting trust;7 but the burden of establishing these
elements is on the plaintiff," and the evidence must be so "clear,"
cogent and convincing as to exclude from the mind of the court all reason-
able doubt as to the existence of the trust."9 Once plaintiff has successfully
established these elements, the defendant, in order to prevail, must estab-
lish that the paities intended that defendant take the beneficial as well
as legal interest in the land.10
It should be pointed out that the Statute of Frauds prohibits the
3. E.g., Davis v. Roberts, 365 Mo. 1195, 295 S.W.2d 152, 156 (1956);
Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. 1954); Parker v. Blakeley, 338 Mo.
1189, 93 S.W.2d 981, 988 (1936); Carr v. Carroll, 178 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1944); 5
A. ScoTt, TRUSTS § 440 at 3310 (3rd ed. 1967). Four state statutes expressly per-
mit purchase-money resulting trusts., See MoNT. Rev. CODE ANN § 86-103 (1964);
N.D. CODE ANN. § 59-01-06(4) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 137 (1963);
S.D. CODE § 59.0102(4) (1939); Cf. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 108-106 (1959). Purchase-
money resulting trusts have been abolished'in New York, Michigan, Kentucky,
Minnesota and Wisconsin and limited in Indiana and Kansas. See text at notes 258
through 266 infra.
4. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEES § 454 at 512, 517-518
(2d ed. 1964).
5. 5 A. Scorr, TRusTs § 440 at 3312 (3rd ed. 1967).
6. See, e.g., Cape County Say. Bank v. Wilson, 225 Mo. App. 14, 34 S.W.2d
981 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
7. E.g., Mays v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 1224, 145 S.W.2d 392 (1941); Woodard
v. Cohron, 345 Mo. 967, 137 S.W.2d 497 (1940).
8. Long v. Kyte, 340 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Mo. 1960).
9. Id. at 627. See Ellis v. Williams, 312 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. 1958); Isenman
v. Schwartz, 335 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Mo. 1960).
10. 5 A. ScoTr, TR uSTS § 440 at 3314 (3rd ed. 1967).
1968]
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creation of an express trust of land by oral agreement. 1 However, a re-
sulting trust need not be evidenced by a writing because the Missouri
Statute of Frauds, like that of most other states, excepts trusts which
"arise or result by the implication of law."' 2 It has been argued that the
purchase-money resulting trust should not come within this statutory
exception because such a trust arises on the theory that there is a pre-
sumed intention on the part of the parties to create a trust and therefore
the arrangement resembles an express trust more closely than one which
arises by legal implication.13 This argument has been satisfactorily rebutted
on two grounds, however. First, the High Court of Chancery held, within
seven years after the enactment of the statute, that a writing is not required
to prove a purchase-money resulting trust of land.'4 Secondly, although
such trusts arise out of the intention of the parties, that intention is
evidenced by the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the
parties rather than by any oral agreement of the parties.' 5
Another spurious argument based on the Statute of Frauds has occa-
sionally been advanced. If a grantee agrees in writing to hold land in trust
for the person paying the purchase price, but the writing is otherwise
defective under the Statute of Frauds, the writing is unenforceable. Ac-
cordingly, it has been argued that a purchase-money resulting trust pre-
sumption may arise only where there is no express agreement because the
11. See § 456.010, RSMo 1959, which provides as follows:
All declarations or creations of trust or confidence of any lands, tenements
or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by
the party who is, or shall be, by law, enabled to declare such trusts, or by
his last will, in writing, or else they shall be void, and all grants and assign-
ments of any trust or confidence shall be in writing signed by the party
granting or assigning the same, or by his or her last will, in writing, or
else they shall be void.
12. § 456.030, RSMo 1959.
13. McMullin, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv.
354, 356 (1941).
14. Anonymous 2 Salk. 676, 86 Eng. Rep. 486 § 361 Case 4 (Ch. 1683).
This case held that where land is purchased in the name of another, the land is
held in trust for the person supplying the purchase price, even though there is no
deed declaring the trust, because the Statute of Frauds did not apply to trusts
created by operation of law. Interestingly, an eighteenth century treatise suggests
that the Statute of Frauds prohibits a resulting trust in the purchase-money situa-
tion unless the deed recites the payment of the consideration by the payor. See
F. SANDERS, USES AND TRusTs 180-181 (1792). This position does not represent the
present state of the law.
15. 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 440 at 3315 (3rd ed. 1967); Purvis v. Hardin, 343
Mo. 652, 122 S.W.2d 936, 938-939 (1938); Wenzelburger v. Wenzelburger, 296
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presence of the express agreement removes the case from the category of
resulting trusts and places it in the category of express trusts.1 Thus,
since the express trust is unenforceable, the grantee should keep the land.
Acceptance of such a position, of course, would lead to the anomalous re-
sult that where a grantee expressly agreed to hold the land in trust, he
would be able to keep the land, but where there is no express agreement
be would be forced to give up the land. Like most other courts, 17 the
Missouri Supreme Court, in Carr v. Carroll,'8 has rejected the above argu-
ment. There the court approved earlier language to the effect that although
"the trust resulting from the acts of the parties could not be converted into
an express trust by the verbal contemporaneous agreement of the parties"
because of the Statute of Frauds, "nevertheless a failure to put the declara-
tion of trust in writing does not prevent a trust from resulting by operation
of law." 19 Furthermore, the Cart court held that parol evidence was ad-
missible to show the purpose of the conveyance in that case.20 Thus, it would
appear that not only does evidence of an oral agreement of trust not pre-
clude the establishment of a purchase-money resulting trust, but such
evidence is extremely helpful in buttressing the existence of such a trust.21
The application of purchase-money resulting trust principles assumes
that although the payor intends to retain the beneficial interest in the
property conveyed to the grantee, he consents to or approves of the con-
16. Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and Construc-
tive, 27 HARV. L. REv. 437, 455 (1914). Professor Costigan would nevertheless find
a constructive trust in such a situation. For an analytical rebuttal to this argu-
ment, see McMullin, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. REv.
354, 356-357 (1941).
17. The cases may be found in 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 441.2, note 1 (3rd ed.
i967).
18. 178 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1944).
19. Id. at 437. See also Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 275, 44 S.W. 467
(1898). But see Ebert v. Myers, 320 Mo. 804, 9 S.W.2d 1066 (1928), which seems
inconsistent with the general trend of Missouri cases. In that case the court stated
that due to the presence of an agreement to hold for the benefit of the person paying
the purchase price, no trust could arise by implication of law. Ebert is strongly
criticized in McMullin, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts In Missouri, 6 Mo. L.
REv. 354, 357-358 (1941). The continued validity of Ebert is extremely doubtful in
view of Cart and Padgett v. Osborne, 359 Mo. 209, 221 S.W.2d 210, 213 (1949).
20. Carr v. Carroll, 178 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo. 1944).
21. This also seems to be the conclusion of the court in Mays v. Jackson,
145 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. 1941) where the court states:
The parol agreement alleged merely tends to show the relationship of the
parties and the character of the transaction, while the resulting trust sought
to be established would arise from the ultimate facts alleged, to wit, that
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veyance to the grantee of the legal title.22 Does this mean that the trust
claimant is required to establish such consent as a prerequisite to the
creation of the resulting trust presumption? Surprisingly the cases and
commentators do not seem to consider this problem. It must be pointed
out, however, that if in fact the conveyance was without the payor's
consent, as we shall note later, a constructive trust will be imposed. 23
Accordingly, it would appear that the trust claimant should not be re-
quired to establish such consent on the part of the payor, since, in any
event, one of the two trust remedies will be available for the trust claim-
ant's benefit.
Although most purchase-money resulting trust cases arise in connection
with real estate transactions, the concept is applicable to personal as well
a real property.24 Cases imposing a resulting trust on personal property oc-
cur with much less frequency than do those dealing with real estate.
This is because the Statute of Frauds does not prevent the proof of an
express oral trust in personal property although it does so in the case
of real property.;5 For example, suppose bonds are purchased with A's
money and A directs that they be registered in the name of B, B agreeing
orally to hold the bonds in trust for A. If B refuses ultimately to re-
transfer the bonds to A. A may establish by parol testimony the existence
of the express oral trust. Nevertheless, there are occasions when reliance
on a purchase-money resulting trust theory is necessary. If, in the above
situation, there was no express promise by B to hold in trust, A would still
be able to rely on the presumption of resulting trust because he paid the
purchase price of property and title thereto was taken in the name of
another. It may be especially difficult to establish the express oral trust
in situations where one of the principal parties to the transaction is dead.
Thus, reliance on the purchase-money resulting trust principle may be
necessary and desirable in personal property as well as real property situa-
tions.
Although there appears to be no direct Missouri case so holding, the
available cases strongly indicate that Missouri recognizes purchase-money
22. 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 440.1 at 3315-3316 (3rd ed. 1967).
23. See text at note 221 infra.
24. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454 at 515 (2d ed.
1964). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440, comment b (1959).
25. RESTATEmENT (SECON) OF TRUSTS § 440, comment b (1959); 5 A. Scorr,
TRUSTS § 440 at 3313 (3rd ed. 1967). See also Northrip v'. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164
S.W. 584 (1914); Gardner v. Bernard, 401 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. 1966); Harris Banking
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resulting trusts in personal property 2 6 An example is Dee v. Sutter.27 In that
case plaintiff brought suit against the deceased to establish a resulting trust
in plaintiff's favor in an automobile held in the name of the deceased. Plain-
tiff alleged that the automobile had been purchased with funds furnished
by her and that title was taken in the deceased because she did not drive
and the deceased was to do most of the driving. The decree was for the
administrator and the sole heir of the deceased, the latter having been
permitted to intervene. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed. It rec-
ognized, however, that a resulting trust was applicable to personal property,
but in the instant case, such a trust was not decreed because the plaintiff
could not "clearly and cogently" establish the essential element necessary
for the presumption of resulting trust, namely that plaintiff actually paid
the purchase price. The decision avoids consideration of whether motor
vehicle title registration statutes28 preclude the imposition of purchase-
money resulting trusts with respect to automobiles; however, since the pur-
chase-money resulting trust doctrine is primarily concerned with real estate,
its further consideration with respect to personal property will in general
be beyond the scope of this article.29
26. Wenzelberger v. Wenzelberger, 296 S.W.2d 163, 166 (St. L. Mo. App.
1956); Dee v. Sutter, 222 S.W.2d 541, 543 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949). Cf., Anderson
v. Biddle, 10 Mo. 23 (1856).
27. 222 S.W.2d 541 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
28. Now § 301.210, RSMo 1959.
29. A student writer in 48 MicH. L. REv. 1221 (1948) argues that the court
in the Dee case was mistaken in assuming that resulting trusts may exist in auto-
mobiles registered under what is now § 301.210, RSMo 1959, and the writer further
concludes that the statute was supposed to supplant old equitable principles of
ownership. This reasoning seems highly questionable. To be sure, Missouri decisions
admittedly have exhibited some tendency to use the registration statutes to cut off
equitable interests in motor vehicles. See, e.g., State ex rel. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Cox, 306 Mo. 537, 268 S.W. 87 (1924) (purchaser acquires no insurable interest
when statutes not complied with); Paragould Wholesale Groc. Co. v. Middleton,
208 Mo. App. 592, 235 S.W. 469 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921) (attaching creditor of
seller permitted to seize automobile from a purchaser who did not obtain a proper
title certificate). There is even language in one Missouri case that there is "no
case in this jurisdiction, or in those having statutes similar to ours, that lends
encouragement to the theory that the legal holder of a title to an automobile can
hold it in trust for another." Hoshaw v. Fenton, 232 Mo. App. 137, 141, 110
S.W.2d 1140, 1144 (Spr. Ct. App. 1937). But cf. Rankin v. Wyatt, 335 Mo. 628,
73 S.W.2d 764 (1934). Nevertheless, the purpose of the statute was to curb a
problem which has become increasingly serious in this highly mobile day and age:
the theft and fraudulent sale of used automobiles. Taylor, Titles to Used Auto-
mobiles In Missour, 28 Mo. L. REv. 121 (1963). Accordingly, it would seem less
likely that the intent behind the statute was to abrogate equitable doctrines with
respect to motor vehicles. If equitable principles were replaced by the Statute,
absurd results. would obtain. For example, if A embezzled funds from B, purchased
an automobile with B's funds and had the automobile registered in A's name,
1968]
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Purchase-money resulting trusts, like other trusts, are subject to the
bona fide purchaser rule.80 Thus, the conveyance of land to a bona fide
purchaser may cut off the payor's right to a resulting trust with respect to
that land.8 1 Similarly, where the trust property is mortgaged to a bona fide
purchaser, the rights of the payor against the mortgagee will be subject to
the lien of the mortgage.3 2 On the other hand, the concept of a bona fide
purchaser does not include donees, heirs, devisees or legatees of the grantee,
and such persons take subject to the rights of the payor.3 3 Moreover, credi-
tors are not purchasers for value and creditors of the grantee generally will
not be able to satisfy their claims against the trust property.34 However,
where creditors rely on the grantee's apparent ownership in advancing
credit to him and the payor knows or has reason to know that credit-
is being advanced in reliance on the grantee's apparent ownership, the
principle of estoppel may prevent the payor from defeating the claims of
such creditors to the trust property.35
there could be no constructive trust in the automobile because it would be im-
possible to go behind the title certificate to establish equitable rights. In fact, the
Missouri Supreme Court has permitted a constructive trust in a very similar
situation. See McHenry v. Brown, 388 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1965).
Even assuming that motor vehicle title registration is to have an effect similar
to the Torrens systems for real estate, in effect in a few states, this should not
necessarily preclude the establishment of a resulting trust in registered automo-
biles. To be sure, under a Torrens system, the registration itself is unimpeachable
save in a few instances, and third party purchasers and lienors are generally per-
mitted to rely on the title certificate without having to be concerned with equitable
interests not appearing thereon. See generally, Staples, The Conclusiveness of a
Torrens Certificate of Title, 8 MINN. L. REv. 200 (1924). However, this should
not automatically preclude the establishment of equitable interests where there
is no prejudice to the protected third parties. Finally, it should be pointed out that
there is non-Missouri authority specifically holding that automobile title registration
provisions similar to those in Missouri do not prevent the imposition of a purchase
money resulting trust. See Douglas v. Hubbard, 91 Ohio App. 200, 107 N.E.2d
884 (1951); In re Lee, 129 F. Supp. 920, 928 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
30. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 466 at 655 (2d ed.
1964). According to the Restatement of Trusts, a "bona fide purchaser" is a
person who takes for value and without notice of the breach of trust, and who is
not knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction.. . ." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS § 284(1) (1959). See Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 44 S.W. 467(1898).
31. 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 459 at 3402 (3rd ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 284, Illustration 2 (1959).
32. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 466 at 655 (2d ed.
1964). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 284, Illustration 5 (1959); see
Warford v. Smoot, 361 Mo. 879, 237 S.W.2d 184 (1951).
33. G. G. BOGERT, LAw OF TRUSTS 436 (1963).
34. 5 A. ScorT, TRUSTS § 469 at 3402 (3rd ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS § 308 (1959).
35. 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 459 at 3402 (3rd ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
Finally, the purchase-money resulting trust should not be confused with
the related gratuitous conveyance resulting use doctrine which is seldom
specifically mentioned in American cases. Under the latter doctrine, where
there is a conveyance of land without consideration, the transferee presump-
tively holds upon resulting use for the transferor. 36 This doctrine developed
because it was common practice during the fifteenth century to convey legal
title to land with a reservation of the beneficial interest in the transferor.5T
The inference or presumption of resulting use was rebuttable by showing that
the use was intended to be in the transferee or a third party.38 The gratuitous
conveyance resulting use differed substantially in one important aspect
from the purchase-money resulting trust. Under the latter doctrine the mere
recital of payment of consideration by the grantee or an habendum clause
to the use of the grantee does not rebut the presumption of a purchase-
money resulting trust, although either provision had that effect in the case
of the gratuitous conveyance resulting use.3 9 Interestingly, even after the
enactment of the Statute of Uses,40 which turned uses into legal estates,
the common law courts in England continued to apply the gratuitous con-
veyance resulting use theory, until its statutory abrogation in 1925. 41
Moreover, the doctrine was not adversely affected by the enactment of the
trust sections of the Statute of Frauds. Prior to the Statute of Frauds, an
oral or improperly executed written declaration of uses incident to a land
conveyance was equally as effective to create an express use as a properly
executed declaration.4 3 After the Statute of Frauds, the gratuitous convey-
ance resulting use concept came within the exception where "a trust or con-
fidence shall or may arise or result by implication or construction of law."44
According to the Restatement of Trusts the gratuitous conveyance re-
sulting use "has not been applied in the modem law of trusts. '45 Although
36. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 116
(1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 73, comment a (1959).
37. 5 A. ScoTt, TRusTs § 405 at 3216 (3rd ed. 1967).
38. Ibid.
39. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REV. 93, 117
(1962).
40. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535); reenacted by Mo. REV. LAws 1825, at 215; now
§ 456.020, RSMo 1959.
41. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REV. 93, 117
(1962). The Statute of Uses was repealed in England by 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1
(1925).
42. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ VII, VIII, IX (1676); now §§ 456.010, 030, RSMo
1959.
43. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in "Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 117
(1962).
44. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § VIII; See § 456.030, RSMo 1959.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 405, comment a (1959).
1968]
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this statement is correct, it may be somewhat misleading. Of course, occa-
sions for the application of the doctrine are extremely rare because con-
veyancing in the United States is done in most instances by some type of
form deed containing a recital of consideration and an habendum clause to
the use of the grantee. Professor Fratcher analyses the problem as follows:
The modern law of trusts deals with uses only to the extent that
they are excepted from execution by the Statute of Uses; that is,
only when the beneficiary's interest is equitable. The gratuitous
conveyance resulting use doctrine applies only to uses which are
executed by the Statute of Uses, so that the interest of the cestui
que we is legal, not equitable.46
Thus, Professor Fratcher concludes that the statement in the Restatement
of Trusts does not necessarily mean that the gratuitous conveyance resulting
use doctrine is no longer viable.47
An examination of Missouri case law indicates that it may be unwise
to disregard completely the gratuitous conveyance resulting use doctrine.
Although the question will seldom arise, several older Missouri cases48 seem
to assume that the doctrine is still in force and one fairly recent decision
tends to reinforce that assumption.49
46. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 118
(1962).
47. Ibid.
48. See Parker v. Blakeley, 338 Mo. 1189, 93 S.W.2d 981 (1936); Weiss v.
Heitcamp, 127 Mo. 23, 29 S.W. 709 (1895); Bobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 411 (1886);
Hickman v. Hickman, 55 Mo. App. 303 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893).
49. Long v. Kyte, 340 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1960). In the Long case a one-share-
holder corporation in 1946 conveyed by quitclaim deed to one Mitchell, a straw-
man, land purchased by the corporation in 1930. Mitchell immediately delivered to
the sole shareholder of the corporation a promissory note and a deed of trust to the
land. He also gave the shareholder a fully executed warranty deed with the space
provided for the grantee left blank. In 1955, the defendant received from the share-
holder the warranty deed with defendant's name inserted, which deed the defendant
promptly recorded. In addition, the shareholder released the note and deed of
trust. The heirs of the shareholder sued to recover the land on a purchase-money
resulting trust theory. The Missouri Supreme Court correctly determined that a
purchase-money resulting trust was inapplicable in this situation because payment
of the purchase price occurred in 1930, and thus could hardly have been a circum-
stance attending the disposition of the property in 1946 or 1955. The supreme
court considered extrinsic evidence, consisting partly of oral statements, and con-
cluded that the intent of the sole shareholder was that the defendant have the
beneficial interest as well as the legal interest in the real estate. The Long opinion
did not indicate whether the deeds contain habendum clauses or recitals of consider-
ation, although it did quote language from Parker v. Blakely, 338 Mo. 1189, 93
S.W.2d 981 (1936), indicating that a recital of consideration prevents a resulting
"trust" in favor of the grantor, "particularly where the conveyance is absolute in
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III. THE NATURE OF THE PRESUMPTION
Once the basic facts have been established by clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence, the presumption of resulting trust may be rebutted by
establishing that the payor intended that the grantee' have the beneficial
interest in the property.50 The usual examples of such situations are where
the payor intends a gift of the purchase price to the grantee or where the
payor advances the purchase price as a loan to the grantee.Y' Obviously,
in the latter situation the real payor of the purchase price is the grantee
since he has incurred a legal obligation to repay the lender5 2
Before examining the problems inherent in rebutting the presumption
of a purchase-money resulting trust, a closer examination of the nature of
the presumption is necessary. It is important initially to determine whether
the term "presumption" connotes what is in reality a presumption or simply
an inference. A presumption is a procedural rule requiring the court to
assume the existence of the presumed fact once the basic fact is established
until the presumption is rebutted. 3 In the case of an inference, once the
basic fact is established the trier of fact may, but is not required, to infer the
existence of the presumed fact.54 If we are dealing with a presumption,
once the party seeking to impose the resulting trust has established that A
paid the purchase price and the property was taken in the name of B, the
presumption of a resulting trust would be established and the burden of
producing further evidence to rebut the presumption would be on the
grantee. The failure to produce such evidence would result in a judgment
for. the party seeking to impose the resulting trust. If, however, the estab-
lishment of the essential facts creates only an inference, the failure of the
to be in the grantee or some third person." Long v. Kyte, 340 S.W.2d 623, 630
(Mo .1960). Professor Fratcher has advanced the view that the court perhaps was
applying parol evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting use in a situation
where such an application was permitted under the Statute of Frauds at common
law and that the supreme court thus indirectly recognized that the gratuitous
conveyance resulting use concept is still in force in Missouri. Fratcher, Trusts and
Succession in Missuori, 27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 118 (1962). Professor Fratcher has also
pointed out that an argument could be made that § 442.460, RSMo 1959 abrogates
the gratuitous conveyance resulting use doctrine. Id. at 117, note 116.
50. 5 A. Sco-r, TRUSTS § 441 at 3326 (3rd ed. 1967).
51. Id. at 3326-3328.
52. A related fact situation which would show no intention that the payor
have the beneficial interest would be where the purchase price is advanced to
discharge a debt to the grantee. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 446
(1959).
53. See, e.g., MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURNE, MANSFIELD, CASES AND
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grantee to provide rebutting evidence should not automatically result in a
judgment in favor of a resulting trust, but would merely permit the fact
finder to make such a determination.
Both major treatises examining resulting trusts equivocate somewhat as
to the nature of the presumption. Professor Scott, for example, although
occasionally referring to "presumptions," for the most part speaks in terms
of an "inference of resulting trust" and "rebutting the inference."55 The
Bogert treatise, on the other hand, tends to use the term "inference" and
"presumption" interchangeably.56 With respect to Professor Scott, at least,
there is strong evidence that by using the term "inference" he is really
delineating a "procedural presumption," as a close analysis of the following
language will indicate:
In other words, if the payor shows that he paid the purchase
price with his money, the burden of going forward with evidence
that it was paid by way of gift or loan to the grantee is on the
grantee; but if evidence is introduced tending to show that it was
paid by way of gift or loan, the ultimate burden of proof is on the
payor to establish his claim to a resulting trust, by showing that the
money was paid as his money with the intention of obtaining the
beneficial interest in the property and was not paid as a gift or loan
to the grantee with the intention that the grantee should have a
beneficial interest in the property.57
In view of Professor Scott's emphasis on the grantee's burden of going
forward with rebutting evidence once the payor establishes the essential
facts, it would appear that he is talking about a procedural presumption
rather than an inference, since logically he would not refer to a "burden"
unless failure to go forward with evidence would result in a judgment for
the party seeking the imposition of the resulting trust. After all, an in-
ference, however persuasive, "does not affect the duty of producing evi-
dence,"5 8 whereas a presumption is compulsory and remains so if it is not
disproved. The Missouri Supreme Court has consistently used the term
"presumption" and has apparently not used "inference" interchangeably
therewith. In Williams v. Ellis,59 the Missouri Supreme Court stated that
55. See generally 5 A. ScoTr, TRusTs §§ 440-448 (3rd ed. 1967).
56. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 454-460 (2d ed. 1960).
57. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 458 at 3399 (3rd ed. 1967).
58. MAGUIRE, WEINSTEIN, CHADBOURNE, MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 698 (5th ed. 1965).
59. 323 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1959); Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri,
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"when one person furnishes the purchase price of land and another takes
the title, the law implies a resulting trust in favor of the former. As the
term signifies, the trust results from those facts; and in that sense it may
be said the law presumes or supposes an intent to create a trust after the
basic facts are proven."60 This language plainly negates any argument that
in Missouri the establishment of the basic facts create only an inference of
a resulting trust rather than a procedural presumption. If the law "pre-
sumes" or "supposes" an intent to create a trust after the establishment of
the basic facts it would be difficult indeed to argue that the trier of fact
has the option rather than the duty of finding in favor of a resulting trust.
Assuming Missouri follows a "presumption" rather than an "infer-
ence" approach in purchase-money resulting trust cases, the courts must,
at least theoretically, face the more difficult problems of (1) determining
when the grantee has satisfied his duty of rebutting the presumption of
resulting trust and (2) what happens to the lawsuit once the presumption
is rebutted by the grantee. There is surprisingly little Missouri case law
dealing specifically with resulting trusts in this context. The Missouri
Supreme Court, however, has stated the general rule that "When substan-
tial evidence is introduced by the party against whom a presumption
operates controverting the presumed fact, then its existence or non-exist-
ence is to be determined from the evidence, exactly as if no presumption
had ever been operative in the case.""' It is unclear what is meant by
"substantial evidence."' The cases in many jurisdictions expressing this
doctrine do not define the term but they do make it clear that the evidence
must be of greater persuasive effect than the minimum that would carry
the issue to a jury.62 In any event, the rebutting of the presumption of
resulting trust should not necessarily mean that payor automatically
loses, but rather that he loses the benefit of the presumption. "Of course,
the facts which give rise to the presumption remain in the case and are
to be considered with other evidence for whatever probative value they
may have."6 3 The presumption of resulting trust, as noted earlier, is
justified by the common experience that people who pay the purchase
price for property intend to receive the benefit of the property.6 4 It has been
60. Williams v. Ellis, 323 S.W.2d 238, 240-241 (Mo. 1959).
61. Michler v. Krey Packing Co., 363 Mo. 707, 715, 253 S.W.2d 136, 140
(En Banc 1952); See LAUER, MissouRi SUPPLEMENT TO MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE, 25 (1963).
62. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 35 (1963).
63. Michler v. Krey Packing Co., 363 Mo. 707, 715, 253 S.W.2d 136, 140
(En Banc 1952).
64. See text at note 4 supra.
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said that when courts are dealing with presumptions that rest on common
experience and inherent probability, and substantial countervailing evi-
dence is produced, the presumption as suck disappears, but the facts
or circumstances which gave rise to the presumption will remain and afford
the basis for a like inference by the trier of fact.65 Thus, under such a theory,
the inference of a trust may remain in the case even though the presump-
tion of a resulting trust drops out.
The foregoing analysis, of course, seems especially applicable to a jury
trial situation although most resulting trust cases are tried in chancery
before the court as the finder of fact. Thus, the chancellor will not as a
general rule be concerned about instructions as to presumptions, directed
verdicts and other problems inherent in a jury trial situation. In fact, as
a practical matter, the concept of rebutting the presumption of a result-
ing trust in chancery would appear to lose most of its technical character-
istics and probably boils down to a determination by the chancellor
whether, in view of the fact that the payor has established the essential
facts of the presumption, the grantee ultimately has provided strong
enough evidence under the circumstances to establish that there was no
intent that the payor retain a beneficial interest in the property. In fact,
this practical, rather than technical, approach to the problems of rebuttal
is the dominant theme in the coverage of resulting trusts by both Scott
and Bogert. An examination of a few leading Missouri cases will provide
some insight into the type of vidence of gift or loan required of the grantee
to defeat the otherwise judicially favored resulting trust.
In Williams v. Ellis,"6 the heirs at law of an uncle sought to impose
a resulting trust on commercial real estate held jointly by defendants, a
niece and nephew of the uncle. In 1949, the uncle bid in at a foreclosure
sale of a second deed of trust on the real estate and was the successful
bidder at $3,500. The property was still subject to a first deed of trust
with a balance of approximately $6,800. Although the uncle paid the pur-
chase price at the sale, title to the real estate was taken in the names of
the defendants. The documents in connection with the first deed of trust
also were "transferred to the defendants." Although there was conflicting
testimony by numerous third parties as to the uncle's intent with respect
to the real estate there was a substantial amount of evidence indicating
a very close personal relationship between the uncle and the defendants.
65. See, e.g., O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A. 486 (1934).
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The uncle often looked after the defendant's children and was frequently
a house and dinner guest. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the find-
ing of the trial chancellor that the evidence sustained a gift from the uncle
to the defendants rather than a resulting trust in favor of the uncle.
Presumably, in view of the above testimony, the Supreme Court concluded
that it was natural in this instance for an uncle to feel beneficent toward
the defendants.
In Adams v. Adams,67 appellant son in 1912, provided a down pay-
ment of $100 on several lots, but the title thereto was taken in the names
of his father and mother. The balance of the purchase price was secured by
three promissory notes and deeds of trust, all of which were executed by
the mother and father. The son subsequently paid off the notes although
there was no indication that there was an agreement to do so prior to th
conveyance. 8 The notes were not cancelled, but were simply assigned to
the son. The son often paid the real estate taxes and also supplied some
money and labor in helping the father build a house on the property,
although older brothers and sisters also shared in maintaining the property.
The mother, who was predeceased by her husband, died in 1935. In a
partition suit brought by the widow of one of the other brothers, appellant
son claimed title to the real estate on the theory of resulting trust. The
trial chancellor refused such relief and the supreme court affirmed, although
the supreme court directed that the appellant was equitably entitled to
reimbursement for his contribution to the taxes. The supreme court denied
the resulting trust on at least three grounds: (1) appellant had waited
over 23 years to assert equitable title to the real estate; (2) appellant's
own witnesses indicated that the down payment was advanced as a gift
or loan because he "was helping out" the parents; (3) the payments on
the notes by appellant were not made pursuant to any agreement exist-
ing at a time prior to the conveyance. 9
Ise-nman v. Sclhwartz70 is a recent instance where the grantee avoided
the imposition of a resulting trust by establishing that the payor advanced
part of the purchase price as a loan to the grantee. In that case land was
conveyed to the plaintiff and defendant as tenants in common. Plaintiff
paid the entire down payment of $2,000. The balance of the purchase
67. 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610 (1941).
68. See text at notes 162 through 163 infra.
69. See text at notes 160 through 193 infra.
70. 335 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1960); Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri,
27 Mo. L. REv. 93, 116 (1962).
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price of $16,000 was supplied by the sale of timber from the land for
$7,000 and by a $7,000 note executed by the plaintiff, the defendant and
'their wives. Plaintiff sued to establish a resulting trust in all of the one
half interest held in the name of the defendant, presumably on some unique
theory that since he supplied all of the cash, he should receive the title.
The trial chancellor denied the resulting trust and this ruling was af-
firmed by the supreme court. Evidence provided by the defendant clearly
established that the parties agreed orally that the land should be sold,
that the sales price should first be used to repay the money supplied by
the plaintiff, and that the balance was to be divided equally between
the parties. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that the payment
in cash by the plaintiff constituted a loan by plaintiff to defendant and
that in any event such payment could not create a resulting trust for plain-
tiff's benefit.
An examination of cases such as those above buttresses the conclusion
that it is probably impossible to define clearly for general application
either the quantity or the nature of the evidence required of a grantee to
prevent the imposition of a resulting trust once the basic elements of
the presumption have been established. Too much depends on the facts
and circumstances of the case and the relationship between the parties.
Countless factors may be relevant. What was the relative financial status
of the parties? In view of the financial status was it imprudent for the
payor to make a gift to the grantee?71 Is there a logical reason why the
payor would want legal title in the name of another? Perhaps, as the
payor in the Adaims case unsuccessfully argued, title was taken in the
grantee's name only because the payor was disabled because of infancy.72
Are the parties related to each other so that a gift would be normal and
understandable notwithstanding the fact that the relationship is not one
which raises a presumption of gift rather than resulting trust? For example,
if a child pays the purchase price and title to real estate is taken in the
name of a parent, even though there generally is a presumption of result-
ing trust, rather than a gift,73 a gift in such circumstances of the amount
of the purchase price is surely not unusual or extraordinary. Nor would a
loan by the payor in such a situation be unexpected. This much was im-
71. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454 at 524 (2d ed.
1964).
72. 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610 (1941). See G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, §
454 at 524, supra note 71.




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
plicitly recognized by the Missouri Supreme Court in the Adams and
Williams cases, both of which involved close family relationships. On the
other hand, where a real estate broker takes title to land and the pur-
chase price is paid by a stranger, it would appear highly unlikely at best
that either a gift or a loan was intended for the benefit of the broker,
Thus, one could reasonably conclude that the broker should be required
to provide the chancellor with much more convincing and substantial
evidence to prevent the imposition of the resulting trust than would be
required of a family member grantee as described above. In any event,
the above examples illustrate that the grantee's burden of producing evi-
dence is not clearly definable but really depends in each case on the extent
to which the circumstances have a natural tendency to indicate an in-
tention on the part of the payor of a gift or loan.
IV. WHERE GRANTEE IS NATURAL OBJECT OF PAYOR'S AFFECTION
The general rule creating a presumption of a purchase-money resulting
trust does not obtain in certain circumstances where the grantee is other-
wise the natural object of the payor's affection. The important consideration
in this connection is not the closeness of the relationship or the extent of
the natural affection between the payor and the grantee, but whether the
grantee stands in such a relationship to the payor that it is probable that
the payor intends to make a gift to the grantee1 4 The Restatement of
Trusts incorporates what appears to be the general rule in this country
by creating a presumption of gift rather than resulting trust where the
purchase price is paid by another and the transferee is a wife, child, or
other natural object of bounty of the person paying the purchase priceY 5
A determination of the extent to which Missouri follows, expands upon or
qualifies the above approach requires analysis of Missouri cases dealing
with specific familial relationships.
A. Husband-wife Relationship
Where the husband pays the purchase price and has the property
conveyed to his wife, Missouri courts uniformly recognize that there is a
presumption of gift to the wife rather than a resulting trust in favor of the
husband.' 6 The reasoning behind this presumption of gift to the wife as-
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 442, comment a (1959).
75. Id. at § 442.
76. E.g., Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer, 274 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo. 1955); Hampton
v. Niehaus, 329 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Mo. 1959); Fisher v. Miceli, 291 S.W.2d 845,
(Mo. 1956); Hernandez v. Prieto, 349 Mo. 658, 162 S.W.2d 829 (1942); Davis
v. Broughton, 369 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App. 1963).
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sumes the legal and moral duty of support owed by husband to wife and
also that gifts from husband to wife are such common occurrences that
such transfers naturally would be attributed to a gift-motive.77 One of
the more common fact situations in Missouri applying the above reasoning
involves payment of purchase price by a husband with the conveyance
going to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. Hiatt v. Hiatt1
exemplifies this type of situation. In Hiatt, plaintiff-wife took title to real
estate in 1938 as a co-tenant by the entirety, with defendant-husband pay-
ing the purchase price. In 1941, the parties apparently were divorced.
Shortly thereafter plaintiff prevailed in an action to partition the real
estate, the trial court finding that she was the owner of an undivided
one-half interest in fee. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
and stated that "where a husband purchases real estate with his own
funds and causes the same to be conveyed to his wife, it will be presumed
the husband intended the conveyance as a provision for his wife, and a
trust will not result.179 The court noted that the same rule applies where,
as in this case, the title was taken in the names of the parties as tenants
by the entirety. The presumption in these cases is that the wife should
have the benefits of the property during the husband's lifetime and should
succeed to the entire property in the event he predeceases her.80
When the relationship is meretricious, however, courts in most juris-
dictions hold that there is a presumption of a resulting trust and no
inference of gift where the man pays the purchase price, but title is taken
partially or wholly in tlie name of the woman."' The Missouri Supreme
Court appears to have reached essentially the same result in Anderson
v. Stacker,8 2 although on a different theory. In that case plaintiff with
his own funds purchased a house and procured a deed purporting to
convey to plaintiff and defendant as tenants by the entirety. Although
they were living together, defendant was not plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff later
sued to quiet title to the real estate which relief was granted by the trial
court. The supreme court affirmed on the theory that a tenancy in com-
mon had been created and it concluded that since plaintiff had contributed
77. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs § 549 at 579-581 (2d
ed. 1964).
78. 168 S.W.2d 1087 (Mo. 1943).
79. Id. at 1090.
80. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 459 at 582-583 (2d ed.
1964).
81. 5 A. Sco'rr, TRuSTS § 442 at 3341 (3rd ed. 1967).
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all of the down payment and monthly payments, plaintiff should have full
tide. The court cited a general rule applicable in partition proceedings that
apportionment need not always be in equal shares but in proportion to the
contributions of the parties. 83 Although the court reached the correct result,
the simpler approach would have been to apply a purchase-money result-
ing trust theory. Here the court could have determined that since plaintiff
paid all of the purchase price, but title was partially in defendant's name,
there was a presumption of a resulting trust unrebutted by defendant. In
any event, the case could be rationalized as placing Missouri within the
general rule with respect to meretricious relationships.
Interestingly, the majority of courts hold that a resulting trust and
not a gift is presumed where a wife purchases property and title is taken
in the name of her husband.8 4 A substantial minority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, take the opposite approach and presume a gift to the husband.8 5
The majority approach, may have made sense at a time when the wife
was economically inferior and had legal disabilities with respect to own-
ing and managing property. In such circumstances it perhaps would be
normal to assume that wives did not give gifts to husbands. In 1954, in
Ferguson v. Stokes,88 the Missouri Supreme Court in dictum indicated an
unwillingness to adhere to the majority position. In that case a wife paid
the purchase price for land and after full deliberation decided to have the
property conveyed to herself and her husband as tenants by the entirety.
Later the wife's heirs brought an action to determine title to the land
and to declare a resulting trust in favor of her estate. The supreme court
did not find it necessary to determine the general type of presumption
applicable because it found ample evidence that the deceased had intended
her husband to take a beneficial interest and that no resulting trust was
intended. The court also indicated that at least where the wife-payor,
having considered the problem, elects to have the property conveyed
to herself and her husband, there will be no presumption of resulting trust.
This reasoning accords with the general approach in this country,8 7 and ap-
83. Id. at 421.
84. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 460 at 598 (2d ed.
1964).
85. E.g., Bingham v. Nat'l. Bank of Montana, 105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90
(1937); Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 53 N.W.2d 912 (1952).
86. 269 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954).
87. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 460 at 601 (2d ed.
1964); Annot. 43 A.L.R.2d 917, 922 (1955); Cisel v. Cisel, 352 Mo. 1097, 180
S.W.2d 748 (1944); Haguewood v. Britain, 273 Mo. 89, 199 S.W. 950 (1917).
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parently applies the rule applicable to al husband-payor situations to the
wife-payor concurrently-held property cases."" What is most interesting
about the Ferguson case, however, is- that the court hints strongly in dicta
that in all cases the general rule as to presumption should be the same
in both wife-payor and husband-payor situations:
It may be that the Married Woman's Acts . . . , and the present
position of married women in financial, commercial, business, in-
dustrial and professional spheres render purely arbitrary the con-
trary assumptions as to the wife-payor and the husband-payor.
And, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we certainly can-
not assume that the wife does not have the same love and affection
for her husband as he has for her. And while the wife has no legal
duty to support her husbafid, we cannot assume that (again,
absent evidence to the contrary) she has no inclination or desire to
assist her husband in financial matters, or to make gifts or confer
benefits upon her spouse.8 9
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 441, comment e (1959) suggests
that in al situations where one party supplies the purchase price and title is taken
jointly with another, a gift rather than a resulting trust should be presumed. There
is some support for this proposition. See 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 441.4 (3rd ed. 1967).
However, no Missouri case law could be found to sustain such a theory in other
than husband-wife joint transactions or possibly in family transactions where the
presumption of gift would otherwise be applicable. See generally text at notes 74
through 106 infra. In fact, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 218 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Mo. 1949),
there is a substantial indication that where one brother pays the purchase price
and title is taken jointly with another brother there is a presumption of resulting
trust rather than gift. A fortiori the result would be the same if strangers are in-
volved. Thus it appears doubtful that the Restatement view prevails in Missouri
in all concurrently held title situations.
It should be noted that the term "concurrently," as used in the above text
with reference to Missouri wife-payor cases, may be overly broad. As we have
noted above, the Restatement would apply a gift presumption in all cases where
the payor takes title with another. The Restatement appears to encompass all
types of concurrent ownership including tenancy in common. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 441, comment e (1959). Professor Scott would similarly seem to
include all types of concurrent ownership, survivorship and non-survivorship,
within the latter rule. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 441.4 at 3332 (3rd ed. 1967). Although
in one instance the Ferguson court refers to title running to "herself and her hus-
band," which would indicate some intention to include all concurrent estates, at
other places the word "jointly" is used, which would indicate at most the inclusion
of only survivorship estates. Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655, 660-661 (Mo.
1954). However, with respect to Missouri, it must be noted that tenancies in
common in husband and wife are somewhat rare and most cases considering this
problem dealt, as did Ferguson, with tenancies by the entirety. Thus, arguably the
Missouri Supreme Court intended to apply a gift rather than trust presumption
only in wife-payor survivorship estate situations. However, there would appear to
be no strong reason why it should not apply Ferguson reasoning to all wife-payor
concurrent estate situations. "




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
Ironically, in some cases the Married Women's Property Act90 could
create a presumption of trust in, favor. of the wife. The Act provides for
the wife's separate property, but also provides it
shall not aflect the title of any husband to any personal property
reduced to his possession with the express assent of his wife;
p rovided, that said personal property shall not be deemed to have
been reduced to posession by the husband by his use, occupancy,
care or protection thereof, but the same shall remain her separate
property, unless by the terms of said assent, in writing, full authority
shall have been given by the wife to the husband to sell, encumber,
or otherwise dispose of the same for his own use and benefit.01
This statute is significant when a husband purchases land with money
belonging to his wife. His title to her money is determined in accordance
with the above statute and if the land is conveyed to him, the legal
title will pass to him, but the equitable interest will be disposed of in
accordance with -the ownership of the purchase money.9 2 Thus, if the hus-
band without the wife's written consent takes his wife's money and pur-
chases land in his name or in concurrent estate with his wife, he will,
because of the statute, hold the land on trust for her.9 3 Thus, even if there
is oral consent by the wife to the husband's action, there would appear
to be a trust for the wife because of the statute.94 It should be pointed
out, however, that this statute will not apply to fact situations such as
that in the Ferguson case, where the wife herself actually makes the ex-
penditure for the purchase price-in other words-where the wife is
actually the purchaser.9 5
B. Parent-Child and Other Familial Relationships
Where the person paying the purchase price is the parent of the
grantee or otherwise stands in loco parentis with the grantee, a presump-
90. § 451.250, RSMo 1959.
91. § 451.250(2), RSMo 1959. (emphasis added).
92. 6 U. Mo. BULL. 40, 41 (1915).
93. See Milligan v. Bing, 341 Mo. 648, 108 S.W.2d 108 (1937); Hudson v.
Wright, 204 Mo. 412, 103 S.W. 8 (1907); Moss v. Ardrey, 260 Mo. 595, 169 S.W.
6 (En Banc 1914); McClood v. Venable, 163 Mo. 536, 63 S.W. 847 (1901).
94. See Hudson v. Wright, supra note 93.
95. Ferguson v. Stokes, 269 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Mo. 1954). Even if the instant
statute were inapplicable, if a husband uses his wife's money without her actlua
permission to purchase property in his own name or if he uses her money with
act'iw1 permission, but takes title in his name without her actual permission, he
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tion or inference of gift or advancement rather than of resulting trust
arises.90 The underlying theory is that the grantee in such circumstances
normally is the natural object of the affection of the payor. Thus, the pre
sumption of gift applies where a parent takes title in the name of a son,
daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law.9 7 Moreover, the same concept
has been utilized in parent-adopted child and parent-illegitimate child sit-
uations.0 8 Although there are early Missouri cases indirectly accepting a
presumption of gift in most of the above situations,9" there has been little
or no recent litigation in connection therewith. There would appear, how-
ever, to be little doubt that Missouri accepts the presumptions described
above. 100
On the other hand, where the payor is a child and the property is
taken in the name of the father, mother or other person standing in loco
parentis with the payor, courts create a presumption of resulting trust
rather than one of gift or advancement. 10 1 The same rule generally obtains
where the grantee is a sibling, niece, nephew, uncle, or aunt of the payor.
10 2
Gifts in such situations are presumably abnormal rather than usual. Mis-
souri has specifically rejected any presumption of gift in the child-payor-
parent-grantee situations. In Padgett v. Osbore,10 3 the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that in the above situation "a resulting trust arises in favor
of the child unless a different intent is manifested and a presumption of a
gift or an advancement does not arise from the relationship."'1 4 Of course,
if there is a legal obligation on the part of the child to support the parent,
perhaps a presumption of gift arguably would result. 0 5 In any event, when-
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 442, comment a (1959). See also
§ 474.090(1), RSMo 1959.
97. 5 A. Sco-r, TRUSTS § 442 at 3333-3337 (3rd ed. 1967).
98. Ibid.
99. E.g., Rankin v. Harper, 23 Mo. 579, 582 (1856). Cf., Blake v. Blake, 226
S.W. 837 (Mo. 1920).
100. There is some indication, however, that there will be a presumption of
resulting trust and not of gift in an uncle-payor, nephew-grantee situation. See
Williams v. Ellis, 323 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1959).
101. 5 A. Scorr, TRusTs § 442 at 3337-3339 (3rd ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 442, comment a (1959).
102. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AN) TRUSTEES § 460 at 614-616 (2d ed.
1964).
103. 359 Mo. 209, 221 S.W.2d 210 (1949).
104. Id. at 213, 221 S.W.2d at 212. See also Davis v. Roberts, 365 Mo. 1195,
295 S.W.2d 152, 156 (En Banc 1956); Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 1047, 156
S.W.2d 610, 614 (1941).
105. Cf. Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041, 156 S.W.2d 610 (1941). There the
Missouri Supreme Court stated that money advanced by a child to secure title
in the name of a parent "is not presumed to be a gift, the status of a child being
the same as that of a stranger, at least where no legal obligation rests on the child
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Missouri courts are faced with less close family relationships such as
brother-sibling, uncle-nephew, aunt-niece and variations thereof, a fortiori
the presumption should be in favor of a resulting trust rather than of
gift or advancement. 0 6
C. Rebuttal of Gift Presumption in nter-Familial Transfers
Although a presumption of gift or advancement is created in certain
transfers, parol evidence is admissible to rebut the presumption of gift and
to establish a resulting trust.1° 7 Missouri cases, however, enunciate what
appears to be a difficult standard for overcoming the gift presumption
by requiring that "such rebuttal must be accomplished by evidence which
is strong, unequivocal and convincing"' 08 and "must leave no reasonable
room for doubt in the mind of the trial chancellor." 10 9 Nevertheless, since
there are numerous Missouri cases where the presumption of gift was re-
butted and a resulting trust imposed,"10 the burden apparently is not in-
surmountable.
What type of evidence rebuts the presumption of gift or advance-
ment? The intention to create a trust rather than a gift may be estab-
lished by circumstances surrounding the transfer or by an examination of
the subsequent conduct of the parties."' In looking to the circumstances
attending the transfer, courts consider the testimony of the parties as to
their intent at the time of transfer."2 The grantee may have indicated
orally at the time of transfer that he took no beneficial interest in the
property. The fact that it would be economically unwise for the payor
to make a gift may indicate an intention not to make a gift. Moreover,
it would be relevant to show that the payor had a valid reason for keeping
106. Cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 218 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Mo. 1949). See note 88 supra.
107. 5 A. ScoTr, TRusTs § 443 at 3343 (3rd ed. 1967). RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRusTs § 443 (1959) provides:
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price
is paid by another, and the transferee is a wife, child or other natural ob-
ject of bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, and the
latter manifests an intention that the transferee should not have the bene-
ficial interest in the property, a resulting trust arises.
108. Warford v. Smoot, 237 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Mo. 1951).
109. Davis v. Broughton, 369 S.W.2d 857, 862 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963). See also
Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer, 274 S.W.2d 250, 255-256 (Mo. 1955).
110. E.g., Warford v. Smoot, 237 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1951); Rebel v. 'Lunsford,
216 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1949); Clark v. Clark, 322 Mo. 1219, 18 S.W.2d 77 (1929);
Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S.W. 946 (1923).
111. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 443 at 3345 (3rd ed. 1967); Hovey v. Hovey, 379
S.W.2d 621, 624-625 (Mo. 1964).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 443, comment a (1959).
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the public from discovering that he purchased the property.113 Actions of
the parties, especially those of the payor, subsequent to the transfer
are also relevant.114 The Restatement of Trusts emphasizes, however, that
subsequent conduct of the parties is relevant only if it serves to establish
the payor's intent at the time of transfer because it is the latter intent
that is crucial to the creation of a resulting trust.115 Recent Missouri opin-
ions have adopted the Restatement position in this respect."16 Of course,
the fact that the payor after the transfer pays taxes and insurance premi-
ums, makes improvements and collects rents may, in any event, be
strong indicia that the payor never intended a gift in the first place.
Modern Missouri cases not only illustrate the varying degrees of em-
phasis that may be placed on acts of the parties subsequent to the transfer,
but they also drive home the salient point that, in the last analysis, the
appellate courts will sustain the trial chancellor's findings with respect to
gift rebuttal evidence. The latter tendency seems to hold true even though
Missouri courts review the fact determinations of the trial chancellor on a
de novo basis. The interesting cases of Warford v. Smoot" 7 and Dallmeyer
v. Dalkeyer 1 illustrate not only this latter tendency, but also provide
helpful examples of the supreme court's treatment of after-transfer acts
of the parties.
In the Warford case, plaintiff-father, who was elderly, provided the
purchase price'for a piece of unimproved land and directed that defendant-
daughter take title thereto. Plaintiff contended that he intended that the
land be in his daughter's name because he was not a Missouri resident and
he therefore felt it would be a more convenient arrangement. Defendant
claimed that the conveyance was a birthday gift. Subsequent to the transfer,
plaintiff had made payments on the real estate taxes, had built a substantial
building on the premises, and had contributed to the costs of bringing a
water main to the property. The trial chancellor found that the usual
presumption in favor of a gift to the daughter had been successfully re-
butted and imposed a resulting trust on the property in favor of the plain-




116. E.g., Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer, 274 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1955); Warford v.
Smoot, 237 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1951); Hampton v. Niehaus, 329 S.W.2d 794, 800
(Mo. 1959). Cf. Hovey v. Hovey, 279 S.W.2d 621, 624-625 (Mo. 1964).
117. 237 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1951).
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after the transfer constituted "positive acts of ownership" which "tended
to corroborate" plaintiff's testimony that "title was placed in defendant
for his convenience."" 9 Moreover, the supreme court emphasized that the
trial chancellor obviously believed plaintiff's version of his intent and that
its finding was supported by evidence which was "clear, cogent and convinc-
ing."'o
The Dallmeyer case presents an interesting contrast to Warford. In
Dallmeyer defendant-husband incident to a divorce proceeding claimed
a resulting trust in certain real properties which stood in the name of plain-
tiff-wife, the purchase price of which had been paid by the husband. Plain-
tiff-wife testified that the conveyances were intended as gifts. Defendant
never directly testified that the transfers were in trust but instead that
they were "for the children." Evidence also indicated that after the trans-
fers the defendant collected rents from the property, made repairs, and
paid for the taxes and the insurance. The supreme court upheld the trial
court's determination that the presumption of a gift to the wife had not
been rebutted. The court noted that the activity of the defendant sub-
sequent to the transfers was relevant, but not conclusive, in rebutting the
presumption of gift. It stated that such evidence was of "little weight"
where the "overwhelming weight of the other evidence-and, especially,
the evidence as to the circumstances at tke time of the transfer-supports
the presumption of an intended gift to the wife.' 121 Thus, it is quite clear
in Dallmeyer that much less weight was given the husband's subsequent
"acts of ownership" than was given to similar acts in the Warford case.
In fact, Warford was not cited in Dallmeyer. Nevertheless, the cases both
appear to reach a correct result, and they do demonstrate a marked in-
clination to defer to the trial court's findings with respect to the presump-
tion of gift. As in Warford, the Dallmeyer court emphasized that "the trial
court expressly found that plaintiff was a more credible witness than de-
fendant. We defer to that finding."' 22 Moreover, the presumption of gift
from husband to wife should be stronger because of the husband's obligation
to support than should be the same presumption in a parent-child situation
as in Warford where there is ordinarily no obligation of supporting children
who have reached majority.
119. Warford v. Smoot, 237 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Mo. 1951).
120. Ibid.
121. Dallmeyer v. Dallmeyer, 274 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Mo. 1955).
122. Id. at 255. See also Hovey v. Hovey, 379 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Mo. 1964).
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V. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE DOCTRINE
A. Loan to Trust Claimant by Grantee
In the ordinary case of a purchase-money resulting trust the person
seeking to establish the trust will be able to prove that he paid the pur-
chase price out of his own funds directly to the grantor. However, a more
sophisticated variety of resulting trust occasionally arises out of what
would otherwise be considered a form of equitable mortgage situation. For
example, A may wish to purchase Blackacre but be unable to secure the
necessary funds. Accordingly, he may agree with B that the latter shall
pay the amount of the purchase price to the grantor as a loan to A, and
as security for the repayment of the loan B shall hold title to Blackacre.
It is simply the same transaction as having A first borrow and physically
receive the money from B and then having A himself make the payment.
In effect we have a form of oral mortgage or absolute deed as mortgage. 2 8
Such mortgage arrangements are perfectly lawful and are enforced by
the courts.124 However, the arrangement also has resulting trust implica-
tions. In reality, A is using his own money to pay the purchase price and
title is taken in the name of another. Thus courts uniformly impose re-
sulting trusts in such situations, subject, of course, to the payment by
A of any remaining amounts on the loan because A's interest in Blackacre
is always subject to B's security interest. 25
The early well-reasoned Missouri case of Scott v. Ferguson128 is in
most respects an excellent example of the application of the resulting
trust in an equitable mortgage situation. In that case plaintiff owned a
sawmill and was engaged in the manufacture of lumber. Defendants were
retail lumber dealers. Plaintiff had dealt with defendants for several years
prior to the transaction involved in this case. In 1899, plaintiff negotiated
for the purchase of land and agreed on a purchase price of $2,00. Plain-
tiff entered into an arrangement with the defendants whereby the latter
advanced the purchase price and the legal title was conveyed to defendants
as security for repayment of the purchase money advanced. Plaintiff oc-
cupied the land and removed timber. Also incident to the loan transaction
was an agreement between plaintiff and defendants whereby defendants
123. See generally, OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 69-86 (1951).
124. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 455 at 534 (2d ed.
1960).
125. 5 A. Scur, TRUSTS § 448 at 3359-3360 (3rd ed. 1967).
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agreed to provide financing for plaintiff's sawmill business and plaintiff
agreed to market all of his product through defendants. Defendants were
to receive a commission on lumber marketed through them. After a dis-
agreement between the parties over the lumber marketing arrangement,
plaintiff brought suit to impose a resulting trust in his favor on the real
estate. The trial* chancellor granted the relief subject to the lien of the
amount unpaid on the loan for the purchase price. The Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed. Defendants argued before the supreme court that a result-
ing trust was improper in this case because plaintiff did not pay the pur-
chase price. The court rejected this argument, noting that plaintiff was
charged with the full amount of the purchase price advanced by defendants
and concurred in the rule that "if one should advance the purchase money
and take title to himself, but shibuld do this wholly upon the account of
the other, he would hold the estate upon resulting trust for the other." 2 7
Meyer v. Meyer,128 a relatively recent case, imposed a resulting
trust where the grantee's loan to the purchaser consisted both of cash and
an assumption of debt. There the plaintiffs lacked the necessary cash
but owned rental property, a part of which was occupied rent-free by
their son and daughter-in-law. Plaintiffs requested their son to locate a
house for them which they could rent or purchase. The son located a
house selling for $4,000. The down payment of $1,000 was supplied by a
loan made by the son to the parents. Title was taken in the name of the
son and his wife as security for the $1,000 down-payment. The son signed
a note for the $3,000 and executed a deed of trust. During the succeeding
six years plaintiffs paid off the loan and paid all taxes and insurance.
After the plaintiffs tendered the payment of the $1,000, the defendants,
son and daughter-in-law, evicted them. Plaintiffs then brought suit to
impose a resulting trust. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs were mere
tenants, the rental consisting of bimonthly payments on the loan and the
payment of insurance and taxes. The trial court granted the relief to the
father subject to reimbursement of defendants for certain amounts ex-
pended by them on the property. The supreme court affirmed and con-
cluded that the facts supported a resulting trust in the situation described
above, to wit: where the title holder supplies the purchase money as a
loan to the actual purchaser and takes title as security for repayment of the
loan. The result and reasoning are sound and are supported by the court's
127. Id. at 582-583, 139 S.W. at 103.
128. 285 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1956).
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determination that the $1,000 down-payment and the assumption of a
$3,000 debt by defendants constituted a loan to plaintiffs. 29
B. Partial Payment
Should the same presumption of resulting trust obtain when the
trust claimant alleges payment of part, rather than all, of the purchase
price? Should the part-payment, albeit small or large, result in a natural
inference of gift or loan rather than resulting trust? Arguably, most
persons have no desire for small interests in land, as for example where
one pays $200 toward the purchase price of $10,000. On the other hand,
it is not at all unusual today for large real estate interests to be owned by
numerous owners with relatively small shares of the total enterprise. Of
course, it could be argued that where there is a relatively small part payment
the presumption should be weaker and thus the defendant should not
need evidence as strong and convincing as normally needed to prevent
the imposition of the trust. 30 In any event, if it is human nature to expect
a return for an expenditure for the whole purchase price, it would seem
just as normal to expect a return on an expenditure for part of the pur-
chase price. Moreover, an inference of a loan is equally unreasonable since
it would appear more usual for the payor in such a situation at least to
obtain a note or an express agreement with respect to the loan.18 1
A few courts, however, have been troubled by the "aliquot part rule"
although this concept seems of less importance today than formerly. These
courts have said that the person seeking the imposition of the resulting
trust must have paid "an aliquot part" of the entire purchase price.'8 2 If
129. See also, Mays v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 1224, 1234, 145 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.
1940); cf. Clowser v. Noland, 133 Mo. 221, 226, 34 S.W. 64, 67 (1896). The above
situation should be sharply contrasted with the following situation: Suppose there
is an oral contract under which A and B agree that B is to purchase land from C
and to resell the land to A, A agreeing to purchase it from B. B then purchases
the land with his own money. A cannot compel B to sell the land to him because
the agreement is unenforcible under the Statute of Frauds. Here it is impossible
to show a loan from B to A so A cannot prove that when B purchased the land he
did so with money lent to A. See 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 448 at 3361-3362 (3rd ed.
1967). Also to be contrasted is the situation where B purchases land in his own
name with money borrowed from A, and A and B subsequently agree orally that A
is to have an interest in the land. No resulting trust should arise because the
subsequent oral agreement is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. Cf.
Stevenson v. Haynes, 220 Mo. 199, 119 S.W. 346 (1909).
130. G. G. and G. T. BOGaERT, TRUSTS AN TRusTas, § 457 at 561 (2d ed.
1964).
131. Ibid.
132. B.g., First State Bank of Phillipsburg v. Mussigbrod, 83 Mont. 68, 271 P.
695 (1928); Sayre v. Townsends, 15 Wend. 647, 650 (N.Y. 1836). For an interest-
ing general discussion of the problems of partial payment, see Meriwether, Result-
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we give "aliquot part" its true dictionary and mathematical meaning it
will mean a fraction which is contained in the whole a certain number of
times without a remainder.13 3 In other words, the fraction must have a
numerator of one. Thus, if a person pays $500 out of a $2,000 purchase
price he would meet all requirements of the rule because his contribution
would be one-fourth of the total price. On the other hand, a payment of
$900 prsumably would not satisfy the rule because a fraction of 9/20 would
be created. It would be unrealistic to suppose that the person making the
$500 payment wished to retain the beneficial interest in his expenditure
any more than the person making the $900 payment. This strictly math-
ematical version of the rule has been rejected by most courts,1 4 and
there is specific language in one Missouri case which appears to have that
effect.' 35
Another offshoot of the aliquot part rule has been to require proof
that "a definite part of the price [was] paid for a definite, correspond-
ing part of the land," as a prerequisite to a resulting trust based on a
partial payment of the purchase price.136 Although there can be little
problem with the first part of the requirement, the part of the rule con-
templating a definite interest in the land defeats the basic assumptions of
the purchase-money resulting trust. The principle behind this type of
trust is that the trust intent can be inferred from the actions of the
payor.'37 If we require the showing of a "definite, corresponding part of the
land," in effect we require the payor to establish some type of express
agreement delineating the exact interest in the land. Arguably this approach
violates the Statute of Frauds since we are attempting to establish a
resulting trust by parol evidence when it would be prohibited by the
Statute to do so with respect to other express trusts. Although in full
payment situations oral agreements are admissible to strengthen the pre-
sumption created by the payment itself, such an agreement is not required
to create the resulting trust, as would appear to be the case with partial
payment under the above rule. 13  Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend
133. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs, § 457 at 565 (2d ed.
1960).
134. Id., § 457 at 566.
135. Cassity v. Cassity, 240 S.W. 486, 490 (KC. Mo. App. 1922).
136. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 457 at 570 (2d ed.
1964). See, e.g., MacNeil v. MacNeil, 312 Mass. 183, 43 N.E.2d 667 (1942);
Druker v. Druker, 308 Mass. 229, 31 N.E.2d 524 (1941); White v. Carpenter, 2
Paige 217, (N.Y. 1830). Cf. Checovich v. Checovich, 157 N.E.2d 643 (1959).
137. See text at note 15 supra.
138. See text at notes 16 through 21 supra.
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the reason that in the full payment situations the law implies that a trust
results from certain acts, while in a partial payment situation, proof of an
express understanding is an additional requirement. 139 Although this re-
quirement seems illogical, it may not be a serious problem because in many
cases there will be some type of conversation between the payor and the
grantor or grantee. However, where one of the original parties is dead, the
Dead Man's Statute may prevent the admission of such conversations and
thus the requirement of an express agreement would prevent the imposition
of the resulting trust.140
Most American courts seem to ignore both aspects of the aliquot part
rule and apply the presumption of resulting trust to all fractional as well
as full payments of the purchase price.' 4 1 The result is to grant to the
payor a resulting trust in the land in a proportion equal to the proportion
the payor's contribution is to the whole purchase price. The cases lay down
no requirement of a showing of an agreement for a specific interest in the
land, although such agreements are often present. This majority view
appears to be represented by the Restatement of Trusts which provides
that "a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom such pay-
ment is made in such proportion as the part paid by him bears to the
total purchase price,"' 42 unless a contrary intention is manifested. This
provision creates an inference or presumption of resulting trust rather than
of gift or loan.143 Missouri cases reflect this majority position of treating
139. The following rationale has been suggested: Where only a part of the
purchase price is paid, the natural result should be a loan; thus, there will be a
presumption of loan intent; this presumption may be overcome by evidence of an
agreement inconsistent with a loan, an agreement for an interest in the land for
the benefit of the payor. See G. G. and G. T.BOGERT, TRUSTS AM TRUSTEES § 457
at 573-574 (2d ed. 1964).
140. In Cassity v. Cassity, 240 S.W. 486 (K.C. Mo. App. 1922), for example,
the plaintiff wife, who paid part of the purchase price, was able to establish a
purchase-money resulting trust against the relatives of her deceased husband even
though the Dead Man's Statute prohibited plaintiff from testifying as to any
agreement between husband and wife. Presumably in a jurisdiction requiring the
agreement, the plaintiff in Cassity would not have been able to impose a resulting
trust.
141. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs § 457 at 562 (2d ed.
1964). See, e.g., Waterman v. Buckingham, 79 Conn. 286 (1906); Clark v. Clark,
398 Ill. 592, 76 N.E.2d 446 (1948); Hatch v. Rideout, 95 N.H. 431, 65 A.2d 702
(1947).
142. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 454 (1959).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 454, comment b (1959). Interest-
ingly, the latter comment uses the word "inference" rather than "presumption" in
describing the effect of partial payment of the purchase price. Quaere which mean-




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
full and fractional payments the same for purposes of creating a presump-
tion of resulting trust.'4
In the early Missouri case of Stevenson v. Smith,145 the mother of
the grantee-son supplied $1,500 of a total purchase price of approximately
$4,800. Upon the mother's death, several of her heirs brought suit to im-
pose a resulting trust on the son for the benefit of the heirs. In reversing
a trial court determination in the son's favor, the Missouri Supreme Court
ignored the implications of the aliquot part rule, stating that a just result
would be better attained "by giving the heirs such proportion of the land
as $1,500 bears to $4,800, i.e., 15/48 or 5/16, but this should be free of
liens."'146 Moreover, the court seemed to assume the applicability of the
same type of presumption of resulting trust in part-payment cases as in
full payment situations. The court said: "[W]here land is purchased by one
in his own name with the money of another, a resulting trust is created by
implication of law, which follows the ownership of money. And where a
part only of the purchase money is furnished by the beneficiary the trust
is for a proportionate share of the land bought."i47
In the recent case of Dougherty v. Duckworth,148 two persons supplied
$3,200 and $4,000 respectively toward a total purchase price of land of
approximately $17,000. Title was taken in the name of a third party, the
defendant. In a suit to impose a resulting trust, the Missouri Supreme
Court, as in Stevenson, ignored the aliquot part rule or any mention of a
requirement of an agreement for a specific interest in the real estate. In-
stead, the court cited with apparent approval the Restatement provision
referred to above,149 and also stated that "upon the proof thereof, Dough-
erty will be entitled to a resulting trust in the proportion which his $3,200
contribution bears to the purchase price. Snider, his co-plaintiff, will be en-
titled to a resulting trust in the proportion which the $4,000... bears to the
entire price."' 150
144. E.g., Dougherty v. Duckworth, 388 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1965); Hynds v.
Hynds, 253 Mo. 20, 161 S.W. 812 (1913); Wrightsman v. Rogers, 239 Mo. 417, 144
S.W. 479 (1911); Stevenson v. Smith, 189 Mo. 447, 88 S.W. 86 (1905). See also
Larrick v. Heathman, 288 Mo. 370, 231 S.W. 975 (1921); Cassity v. Cassity, 240
S.W. 486 (K.C. Mo. App. 1922).
145. 189 Mo. 447, 88 S.W. 86 (1905).
146. Id. at 465, 88 S.W. at 91.
147. Td. at 466, 88 S.W. at 91 (emphasis added).
148. 388 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1965).
149. See note 142 supra.
150. Dougherty v. Duckworth, 388 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Mo. 1965). One previous-
ly mentioned- Kansas City Court of Appeals decision, Cassity v. Cassity, 240
S.W. 486 (K.C. Mo. App. 1922), although sound and for the most part well-reas-
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A closely related problem is exemplified by the Missouri case of
Shelby v. Shelby.151 In that case several brothers and sisters together with
their mother and father contributed varying and undefined sums to the
down payment for the purchase of a family residence. Title was originally
taken in the name of the mother and after several conveyances without
consideration, title wound up in the name of the spouse of one of the siblings.
Several of the brothers and sisters brought suit to impose a resulting trust
in their favor in the property. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
trial chancellor's decree in favor of the trust claimants because "one who
proves that he paid 'some money' toward the price ... should get no trust,
because of the indefiniteness and vagueness of his evidence."! 52 The above
case reflects the fairly common situation of family members purchasing
real estate with money from a pool or fund contributed to in varying de-
grees by the family members, title being taken in the name of one of the
family members. Many courts follow the rule in Shelby,153 although some
courts solve the problem by awarding all of the contributors equal shares. 154
Professor Scott indicates that the indefiniteness of the payor's con-
tribution in situations similar to that described above results in a re-
buttable presumption of gift or loan.155 It seems unnecessary, however,
that courts should have to consider this situation as one of changed pre-
sumptions. Where the amount of the contribution is indefinite, it simply
means that the payor has failed to establish by "clear and convincing
evidence" the amount of his payment toward the purchase price. The
common fund situations simply demand that the payor be able to show
with relative exactness the amount of his contributions. This is clearly a
oned, does have one puzzling aspect. In that case the court affirmed the trial chan-
cellor's award of a resulting trust in favor of a wife for a fractional interest in real
estate. In so deciding, the court specifically rejected the argument that required the
payor to pay for a specific part or interest in the real estate. However, after stating
the otherwise acceptable rule that where several persons contribute to the purchase
money, a resulting trust arises in favor of each pro tanto, the court added the
qualification "so long as the contribution made is not a general one." What does the
court mean by "general"? Does this mean that there must be some type of agree-
ment or understanding that the payor take a specific interest or part of the real
estate? If so, the court's effort in its prior attempt to discredit such a concept
would appear to have been negated.
151. 357 Mo. 557, 209 S.W.2d 896 (1948).
152. Id. at 563, 209 S.W.2d at 899.
153. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUsTs § 454 at 3374 (3rd ed. 1967). See, e.g., Dee v. Sut-
ter, 222 S.W.2d 541 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949); Clubine v. Frazier, 346 Mo. 1, 139
S.W.2d 529 (1940).
154. 5 A. ScoTr, TRusTs § 454 at 3375-3376 (3rd ed. 1967).
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reasonable requirement since the court must know the amount of the con-
tributions in order to assign proportionate beneficial shares in the real
estate.
Where the payor provides a fractional share of the purchase price, will
the presence of an oral agreement that he is to receive a greater share of
the real estate permit him to enforce a resulting trust with respect to that
greater share? In Dougherty v. Duckworth,""s discussed above, the Missouri
Supreme Court followed traditional lines of analysis in resolving the ques-
tion. In that case the trial chancellor decreed a resulting trust for the two
plaintiffs for a three-fourths interest in the real estate based on an oral
agreement at time of purchase providing for such an apportionment.
The supreme court however, refused to permit a resulting trust in the
real estate in a proportion greater than the proportion the contributions
toward the purchase price were to the total purchase price, because to
do so the court felt would violate the Statute of Frauds.157 This reasoning
is sound because there is ordinarily no Statute of Frauds problem when
the court imposes a purchase-money resulting trust since the trust arises
from the legal implications of the actions of the parties rather than from
any oral agreements.158 To permit the imposition of a resulting trust for
an interest greater than that represented by the part payment of the
purchase price would require reliance on an oral agreement and therefore
run afoul of the Statute of Frauds. On the other hand, the party seeking
to prevent the imposition of the trust should be able to show that under
an oral agreement the payor agreed to take less of an interest in the real
estate than would otherwise be indicated by the amount of the part pay-
ment. Here the agreement is merely used to rebut in part the presumption
of an intention to create a trust, and partial as well as complete rebuttal
of this presumption is permissible. 5 9
156. 388 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1965).
157. Id. at 876.
158. See text at note 15 supra.
159. See generally 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 441.3 and 454.2; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 454, comment k (1959). Also to be considered are the re-
sulting trust consequences where the oral agreement provides for beneficial in-
terests in land other than concurrent undivided interests in the whole. Suppose
that the grantee and the non-grantee payor each pay half of the purchase price
and there is a pre-conveyance oral agreement that one party was to have a
limited estate in the land, such as a life estate or a term for years, and the other
the remainder interest. Should the non-grantee payor be entitled to a resulting trust
in the interest or estate in land provided for in the oral agreement? There are
cases that answer in the negative. See Long v. Scott, 24 App. D.C. 1 (1904);
Juranek v. Juranek, 29 Cal. App. 2d 276, 84 P.2d 195 (1938). However, other
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C. Deferred Payment Problems
The Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly said that "a resulting
trust must arise, if at all, at the instant the deed is taken. Unless the
transaction is such that the moment the title passes the trust results from
the transaction itself, then no trust results. It cannot be created by sub-
sequent occurrences."'u 0 The same court has also phrased the rule to the
effect that the trust must arise "at the time of or anterior to the execution
of the conveyance by which the title passes and cannot be created by
subsequent occurrences."'"" The above statements, although not entirely
clear, suggest that although the circumstances necessary-to create a result-
ing trust may arise prior to the passage of legal title to the grantee, the
latest date, for the occurrence of such circumstances is the time of passage
of legal title.
It has been argued that where the payor pays the purchase price after
the grantee has entered into a written land contract, but prior to the
passage of legal title, "[a] resulting trust will not arise in [the payor's]
favor unless he pays the purchase price at or prior to the time when [the
grantee] receives the beneficial interest."'6 2 Support for this argument is
found in the fact that equitable or beneficial title normally passes to the
cases and more recent commentary advocate giving effect to the oral agreement.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Scribner, 97 N.H. 65, 80 A.2d 386 (1951). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 454, illus. 12 and 13 (1959).
Suppose instead that in the above hypothetical the oral agreement provides
that each party is to have exclusive fee simple ownership in a specific part of
the whole tract equal in area to one half of the whole tract. Courts generally im-
pose a resulting trust in favor of the non-grantee payor on the specific part of the
whole tract. See, e.g., Cloud v. Ivie, 28 Mo. 578 (1859); RESTATEMENT, (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS § 454, illus. 9 (1959). Where the oral agreement provides that the
non-grantee payor is to have a specific part of the whole tract with an area pro-
portionately larger, with respect to the whole tract, than his contribution bears
to the whole purchase price, it would appear that such a payor should get the
part of the whole tract orally agreed upon. See 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 454.3 at 3381
(3rd Ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 454, illus. 11 (1959). But
c.f. Stevenson v. Smith, 189 Mo. 447, 88 S.W. 86 (1905). Presumably the same
rule should apply where the non-grantee payor orally agrees to take a specific part
of the whole tract with an area proportionately smaller, with respect to the whole
tract, than his contribution bears to the whole purchase price. See 5 A. Scorr,
TRUSTS § 454.3 at 3381 (3rd ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 454,
illus. 10 (1959). In all of the above situations the tendency of the courts is to rely
on the valuation of the parties as to the different parts of the whole tract.
160. Davis v. Roberts, 295 S.W.2d 152, 157 (Mo. En Banc 1956); Dougherty
v. Duckworth, 388 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Mo. 1965); Lehr v. Moll, 247 S.W.2d 686,
689 (Mo. 1952); Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 473, 477, 220 S.W. 929, 930 (1920).
161. Welborn v. Rigdon, 231 S.W.2d 127, 133 (Mo. 1950). See also Parker v.
Blakely, 338 Mo. 1189, 1201-1202, 93 S.W.2d 981, 988 (1936).
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grantee at the date of the contract. Nevertheless, the date of passage of
legal title and not the date of the land contract should be the crucial date
for determining the rights of the parties. The Bogert treatise supports this
position as follows:
True, the contract vendee . . . at the time of the making of the
land contract, gets an equitable interest in the land solely for his
own benefit; but when the deed is delivered to him as the sole
grantee, after the payment on the price has been made by the
third person with the knowledge and consent of the grantor and
grantee, both grantor and grantee, as well as the third party payor,
are assumed to intend that the third party's payment shall give him
a beneficial interest in the land pro tanto.163
This is the majority view'6 4 and a fortiori applies to the common earnest
money situation where the contract is not a long-term financing device.
In Davis v. Roberts, 65 the plaintiff concluded a transaction by which a
lot containing a house was conveyed to his parents. The plaintiff paid $1,000
down on a purchase price of $5,000. The balance was covered by notes
secured by deeds of trust, all of the instruments being executed by the
parents only. Subsequently, plaintiff paid off the $1,000 second deed of trust
and purchased the $3,000 first deed of trust. Plaintiff sued the other heirs
of his parents to have a resulting trust imposed on the real estate as to the
whole title. The trial chancellor granted plaintiff's request. The supreme
court reversed the trial chancellor and in relying on the above rule per-
mitted a resulting trust in plaintiff's favor only to the extent of his $1,000
down payment, because the subsequent payments were not paid under any
obligation assumed at the time of the passage of legal title and were thus
not incident to the transaction in which the conveyance was made.
The rule followed in the Davis case would appear to require that the
trust claimant either make his payment or at least obligate himself before
legal title passes to the grantee. Thus, if property is conveyed to A, who
pays a down-payment and executes a promissory note for the balance, the
subsequent payment by B of the note indebtedness pursuant to a subse-
163. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 456 at 560 (2d ed.
1964).
164. E.g., Neusted v. Skernswell, 69 Cal. App. 2d 361, 159 P.2d 49 (1945);
Rexburg Lumber Co. v. Purrington, 62 Idaho 461, 113 P.2d 511 (1941); Moore v.
Moore, 74 Miss. 59, 19 So. 953 (1896) (an excellent analysis). Lynch v. Herrig,
32 Mont. 267, 80 P. 240 (1905); Contra, Musselman v. Myers, 240 Pa. 5, 87 A. 425
(1913).
165. 295 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
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quent oral agreement by which B is to get an interest in the land will not
create a presumption of resulting trust because B was not obligated to do
so before the passage of legal title. 6 6 To give effect to the oral agreement
would run afoul of the Statute of Frauds.0 7 However, B may, presumably,
recover from A the amount he paid on the promissory note because other-
wise A would be unjustly enriched. 18 On the other hand, if the promissory
note is secured by a mortgage, payment of the indebtedness by B will per-
mit him to be subrogated to the mortgage lien. 6 9 The rights of reimburse-
ment and of subrogation are supported in the Missouri case of Dougherty v.
Duckwortt,170 where one of the parties paying part of the purchase price
also made a few payments on a first deed of trust promissory note executed
by the grantee as his contribution to the purchase price. Although no
resulting trust was permitted with respect to the note payments, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court stated that the payor "may . . . elect on remand to
assert a claim for reimbursement based upon the payments which he has
made on the indebtedness and also for subrogation to the rights of the
holder of the deed of trust with respect to the payments so made."' 7' Al-
though the foregoing language is somewhat unclear, the court presumably
does not mean that the payor can get both reimbursement and subrogation
but only that subrogation is available to secure his claim for reimburse-
ment.
172
166. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 456 at 548-549 (2d ed.
1964).
167. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 457 at 3397 (3rd ed. 1967).
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid; RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TRUSTS § 458, comment a (1959).
170. 388 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1965). The case is also discussed in pt. V, § B of
this article.
171. Id. at 877.
172. A difficult problem presented by the facts in Dougherty but not con-
sidered is what type of subrogation can be given, if any, where the payor does not
satisfy the entire encumbrance, but only made part payment thereof. Of course,
if the entire encumbrance is satisfied by such a payor, the payor should step into
the shoes of the mortgage or trust deed holder for purposes of property and other
rights. But if the payor makes only a part payment on the encumbrance, should
he become proportionally a coordinate lienor with the holder of the encumbrance,
or should he simply get what amounts to a second lien on the real estate? If the
real estate is worth enough to satisfy both the mortgage or trust deed holder and
the payor, there is no problem. However, unless the mortgagee has in effect agreed
to an assignment of a proportionate amount of the encumbrance by accepting part
payment, the mortgagee arguably should be able to treat the payor as agent for
the mortgagee, in which case the status of the encumbrance would not be effected.
In fact, it is not at all clear that there are rights to subrogation unless there is a
full discharge of the lien. Cf. 50 AM. JUR. SUBROGATION § 120 (1944). In such a case
the payor would be relegated to second lien status. Very little authority could be
found dealing with the above problem. For a general discussion of mortgage sub-
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On the other hand, where the payor is able to establish that he made
subsequent payments with respect to the land to the grantor pursuant to an
obligation to do so incurred prior to the passage of legal title to the grantee,
he may in certain instances be entitled to a resulting trust1 3 For example,
suppose a vendor conveys land to A, the latter making a down payment.
A promissory note for the balance is executed by A and B or by B alone
prior to the passage of legal title. If B pays the note in full under either of
the above situations, B should be entitled to a presumption of resulting
trust in the land.174
A resulting trust has also been imposed in the situation where the trust
claimant makes payments to the grantee or the grantor after passage of
legal title pursuant to a pre-conveyance agreement with the grantee to do
so.' 7 5 In Shelton v. Harrison,'7 Harrison entered into an oral understanding
with several other persons, including plaintiffs, whereby land was to be
purchased and paid for in twelve monthly installments by all of the parties.
Ultimately the land was to be held by a corporation with each of the
parties an equal shareholder. Pursuant to their obligations under the agree-
ment plaintiffs began making monthly payments to Harrison. Shortly there-
after, Harrison paid a small down payment and took title to the real estate
in his name. After each payment Harrison issued a receipt referring to the
understanding and used the monthly payments in turn to pay notes and a
deed of trust executed by him to cover the balance of the purchase price.
After nine of the twelve payments had been made by the plaintiffs and
applied by Harrison to the notes, Harrison died. After his death no further
payments were made and the deed of trust was foreclosed. After the fore-
closure sale a surplus of over $700 was paid to Harrison's wife, the defend-
ant. The plaintiffs sought a purchase-money resulting trust in the surplus.
The decree of the trial court in their favor was affirmed by the Springfield
Court of Appeals.
An argument could have been made in Shelton, as well as in all similar
situations, that the plaintiffs did not promise to pay the purchase price,
because technically one can only pay the purchase price to the seller of the
land.'7 7 The plaintiffs' agreement was simply to pay the grantee so the
173. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 456 at 522 (2d ed.
1964).
174. Id., § 456 at 552.
175. E.g., Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S.W. 634 (Spr. Ct. App.
1914); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903).
176. 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S.W. 634 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
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latter could pay the purchase price. On the other hand, it could be argued
that the performance of the plaintiffs was in substance the same as paying
the purchase price at the time of the deed or that, in any event, the actions
of the plaintiffs justified a presumption of an agreement that the plaintiffs
should have an equitable interest in the real estate. The court in Shelton
did not directly consider these arguments but seemed to implicitly endorse
the former position because it referred to plaintiffs as those "who furnish
the purchase money."
Whether the agreement to pay is entered into between trust claimant
and grantor or between trust claimant and grantee, if the trust claimant
never performs, (i.e., if no payments are made) there can be no resulting
trust in the real estate.178 Presumably it would be inequitable to afford such
a promisor an interest in the real estate merely because a promise was made
that was not performed. A more difficult question in such cases would arise
where the trust claimant, because of a breach of his agreement, only
partially performs his obligation to pay. The question then becomes
whether he should be entitled to a pro rata presumption of resulting trust
corresponding to his actual payments or whether his breach should bar
such a result. Surprisingly, there is very little authority on this problem.
In fact, the plaintiffs in Shelton apparently ceased to make payments after
the grantee's death and this action arguably constituted a breach of the
agreement to pay the grantee. Yet apparently no significance whatsoever
was attached by the court or the parties to this possible breach on the part
of the plaintiffs. Although the imposition of a resulting trust does not con-
stitute the enforcement of a contract because the trust is legally implied
from certain acts of the parties,179 it could nevertheless be argued that to
permit the breaching payor to receive a pro rata resulting trust is analogous
to allowing a party in substantial breach to enforce a land contract. And, of
course, any plaintiff in substantial default will not be allowed in other
situations to enforce a land contract. 80 Nevertheless, even if there is a
refusal to permit a resulting trust presumption in such circumstances, the
breaching plaintiff arguably should be able to recover the value of his
payments from the grantee personally on an unjust enrichment theory.'8
178. See Id., § 456 at 551-552.
179. See text at note 15 stp ra.
180. See SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 184 at 373 (2d ed. 1965).
181. In the somewhat analogous land contract breach situations where the
vendor rescinds the contract for the vendee's material breach and sells the land
to another purchaser, there are cases granting restitution for the payments made
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Another interesting question not directly considered in the Shelton
case is whether the pre-conveyance promise to the grantee to make future
payments must be legally enforceable. In Skelton, the agreement to make
the monthly payments was oral and thus there may have been some doubt
as to whether the Statute of Frauds rendered the promise unenforceable. A
New Hampshire case, Crowley v. Crowley,182 presents a better illustration
and a cogent analysis of the problem. In that ease plaintiff-son at age 17
made the down payment of $300 on a farm he wished to purchase. Since the
seller refused to convey to a minor, plaintiff's father took title and also
executed a promissory note and a mortgage for the balance of $440. The
facts suggested an oral agreement that plaintiff would make the payments
on the note, and he did in fact pay off the note. After the death of the
father, the defendant, the stepmother of the plaintiff, refused on demand to
convey the legal title to the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for the imposition of a
resulting trust. Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed a
lower court decree for the plaintiff on grounds not relevant to the present
discussion, the court's reasoning is extremely instructive. One of the defend-
ant's arguments was that no resulting trust was possible because the entire
purchase price was not paid at the time of purchase. The court rejected this
argument and pointed out that if plaintiff induced his father to execute the
note and plaintiff at the time of its execution promised to pay it, a resulting
trust would arise by implication. Moreover, the court also reasoned that
"It matters not how it is paid, whether by money on hand or borrowed, or
by the promise or obligation of the cestai que trust himself, or of some other
person procured by him for the purpose."' 83 Most importantly, however,
the court considered the fact that the plaintiff's promise to pay the note
executed by the father may have been unenforceable because of plaintiff's
infancy or because of the Statute of Frauds. Since the payments had already
been made, the fact that an unexecuted promise to pay may have been
unenforceable was considered by the court to be "immaterial.' 84 This rea-
soning is sound; the unenforceability of the promise in such a situation
should be irrelevant since the promise has already been performed. What
sumably, the grantee in a situation where no resulting trust will be imposed should
not be able to retain both full title and the trust claimant's payments, notwith-
standing the default on the latter's part.
182. 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903).
183. Id. at 244, 56 A. at 192.
184. "If the plaintiff had avoided paying the note by availing himself of his
infancy, or the statute of frauds, the foundation for a resulting trust would fail;
but as he has paid the note, the infirmity in the orignal agreement, if it be found
that he made one, would become immaterial." Id. at 244-245, 56 A. at 192.
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the resulting trust claimant seeks is not enforcement of that promise but,
rather, simply to establish that he agreed prior to the passage of legal title
to the grantee to pay the balance of the purchase price-in other words,
to help establish that the subsequent payments relate back to the acquisi-
tion by the grantee of legal title in the real estate.
May improvements to real estate have resulting trust consequences?
Missouri courts have generally refused to impose a resulting trust where the
trust claimant's request is based on improvements made to real estate
held in the name of another.18 5 The reasoning is relatively simple: The
price of the land generally has already been paid and the trust claimant is
simply adding to the value of real estate owned by another in fee simple
absolute. Welbort v. Rigdon180 is illustrative of this principle. In that case
plaintiff and defendant agreed that plaintiff would make certain improve-
ments to the real estate already owned by the defendant. Thereafter the
property was to be sold and the proceeds divided as follows: defendant was
to have what the property cost her, plaintiff was to have the amount of his
expenditures and each was to have half of the balance of the sale proceeds.
At the time of the agreement plaintiff and defendant were romantically
interested in each other. Plaintiff made improvements to the real state of a
value of over $7,000 and after a falling out between the parties, plaintiff
brought suit and, among other things, sought the imposition of a resulting
trust on the real estate for his benefit. The Missouri Supreme Court stated
that a resulting trust was unavailable because "none of his funds were used
in the purchase of the property," and because a resulting trust must arise
if'at the time of or anterior to' the execution of the conveyance by which
the title passes and 'cannot be created by subsequent occurrences.' "187
It should be emphasized, however, that resulting trust consequences
should not necessarily be denied to all claimants who have constructed
improvements on real estate. To be sure, most such claims arise out of
agreements to construct improvements entered into with a party who al-
ready has taken title. In such cases, as we have noted, the improvements
185. E.g., Welborn v. Rigdon, 231 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1950); Wenzelburger v.
Wenzelburger, 296 S.W.2d 163 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
186. 231 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1950).
187. Id. at 133. The court also rejected plaintiff's request for an equitable lien,
but did rule that the agreement was not within the Statute of Frauds and that the
plaintiff would have an action for damages based on defendant's breach of contract
to make improvements. Id. at 133-134. But see Cunningham v. Kinnerk, 74 S.W.2d
1107 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934) where a resulting trust was imposed on land in
favor of one who constructed building thereon after grantee obtained title although




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
PURCHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
have no relationship to the purchase price. However, it is not difficult to
conceive of situations where the promise to make improvements constitutes
the promisor's contribution to the purchase price. For example, suppose A
and B are interested in purchasing together certain partially swampy prop-
erty for real estate development. The desire is that A own a two-thirds and
B a one-third interest in the property. B, however, does not have enough
cash to meet his part of the purchase price. B does, however, own drainage
equipment and would be able to construct the necessary drains to
make the land suitable for development. Accordingly, A agrees orally to pay
the full purchase price for the land and B agrees that, after the vendor
delivers title, B will construct the drainage system necessary to drain the
land. The oral understanding is that B's improvements should entitle him to
a one-third interest in the real estate. A, with B's approval, takes title in his
own name. B later constructs the improvements in accordance with his
agreement and A refuses to convey to B his one-third interest. B sues to
impose a purchase-money resulting trust. B should benefit by a presumption
of resulting trust in his favor. Here the improvements admittedly were made
after A took title, but the agreement to construct the improvements took
place prior to the conveyance and are simply B's contribution to the pur-
chase price. Thus, a convincing argument could be made that B did con-
tribute to the purchase price of property taken in the name of A and that
B's resulting trust rights arose "'at the time of or anterior to' the execu-
tion of the conveyance by which the title passe[d]. . . "188 This hypotheti-
cal situation is somewhat analogous to the one in Crowley v. Crowley, s 9
the New Hampshire case discussed previously. In that case the trust claim-
ant in all likelihood agreed before the conveyance to pay off a note to be
executed by his father to cover the balance of the purchase price, and in fact
the note was thus satisfied. There the subsequent payments related back
to a pre-conveyance agreement and a resulting trust was appropriate.
Similarly, in the hypothetical case, the subsequent building of the drainage
system is in reality B's contribution to the purchase price and relates back
to a pre-conveyance agreement and a resulting trust was appropriate. Of
course, in the latter situation, the "payment" is not directed to the vendor,
but as in Skelton v. Harrison,'" the "payment" instead goes to the grantee
so the latter is enabled to pay the purchase price.
188. Welborn v. Rigdon, 231 S.W.2d 127, 133 (Mo. 1950).
189. 72 N.H. 241, 56 A. 190 (1903).
190. 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S.W. 634 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
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In certain improvement cases, even though a resulting trust would be
inappropriate, other relief such as an equitable lien may be available to the
trust claimant. Such a remedy may be imposed, for example, where one
party erects improvements on land under an honest mistake as to the
title.'9 ' For example, in the very recent case of Coffman v. Coffnn, 192
a husband paid for the construction of a house on a lot he thought was
owned by his wife, but in which his wife actually had only a life estate.
The supreme court agreed that the imposition of a resulting trust was im-
proper, but concluded that an equitable lien was appropriate because of the
husband's mistake as to the state of the title to the lot. However, in situa-
tions such as the Welborn case, this ground for an equitable lien does not
exist because the plaintiff is fully aware of the state of title. This will
usually be the case where the agreement to construct improvements does
not antedate the grantee's legal title. Missouri cases also state that an
equitable lien would be appropriate where there is no adequate remedy at
law and justice would suffer without the equitable remedy. This doctrine
has generally been limited, however, to situations where there is an express
agreement or conduct from which an intention may be implied that spe-
cific property shall be security for a debt or obligation. 193 The Welborn
court, for example, was unable to find such an intention either implicitly or
by express agreement in that case.
One additional problem with respect to purchase-money resulting
trusts and credit land transactions deserves special attention. The problem
is posed by the following hypothetical presented by the Restatement of
Trusts:
X is the owner of Blackacre. A purchases Blackacre from X for
$10,000, $4,000 to be paid in cash, the balance to be secured by a
mortgage on the land. A pays X $4,000, and at A's direction X con-
veys Blackacre to B who gives X his note for $6,000 secured by a
purchase-money mortgage on Blackacre. 1' *
Clearly, A should have the benefit of a presumption of purchase-money re-
sulting trust at least as to the $4,000 down payment. As to the balance
191. See Coffman v. Coffman, 414 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1967); Welborn v. Rig-
don, 231 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1950).
192. 414 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1967).
193. E.g., Wilkinson v. Tarwater, 393 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Mo. 1965); Hahn v.
Hahn, 297 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Mo. 1957) (En Banc).
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of $6,000, however, the Restatement of Trusts concludes that the fact alone
that B obligated himself as to the balance should not raise an infer-
ence that B has a beneficial interest in the real estate; rather there should be
an inference of resulting trust for the benefit of A for all of the land. Here
the additional inference is that A undertakes to exonerate B from any
liability to pay X if on foreclosure the property should be insufficient
to pay the balance of the purchase pricemTh Of course, B cannot be
compelled to transfer title to A until A pays off the mortgage.196
Missouri cases, however, apparently apply different reasoning with respect
to the $6,000 balance. Davis v. Roberts197 exemplifies Missouri's difference
from the Restatement in this respect. In that case plaintiff's son made a $1,000
down payment on a house, the title to which was taken in the name of his
parents. The parents executed notes and deeds of trust for the balance. Even
though the son paid off the notes, the court allowed no presumption of result-
ing trust in the son's favor beyond the $,1000 down payment because the son
was not legally obligated in any way to pay off these notes; nor were the pay-
ments made pursuant to any pre-conveyance agreement with the parents or
the vendor. In other words, the court seemed to assume that the actions of
the parents in executing the notes and deeds of trust simply constituted, with-
out other indication to the contrary, their contribution to the purchase
price of the house.9 8 On the other hand, the Restatement of Trusts would
seem to assume that where more than one party contributes toward the
purchase of land, the party supplying cash should have a preferred status,
as to the presumption of resulting trust in the whole interest, over the
party who takes title and contributes his secured note toward the purchase
price. The Missouri approach, however, appears somewhat more realistic in
that it assumes, absent evidence to the contrary, that a party who takes
title and obligates himself alone as to the balance of the purchase price,
intends to obtain a beneficial interest in the real estate. Normally, a person
would think twice before executing a note as the sole obligor without some
expectation of an interest in the property. The party supplying the cash
in the above situation should at least have to establish that he agreed prior
to the delivery of the deed that he would be responsible for payment of the
195. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 456, comment f (1959).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 456, Illustration 8 (1959).
197. 295 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. En Banc 1956). See previous discussion of Davis
in text at note 165 supra.
198. For reasoning apparently similar to Davis see Dougherty v. Duckworth,
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note and that the grantee was to be exonerated of any personal liability in-
curred because of his execution of the note.
VI. ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF PAYOR--"CLEAN HANDS" PROBLEM
As in other equitable contests, the clean hands doctrine is applicable to
actions of payors to establish purchase-money resulting trusts.199 Title is
often taken in the name of a person other than the payor for a variety of
legitimate reasons. These range from the desire in certain instances to con-
ceal a purchase from friends and family to the credit situation where the
grantee holds title as security for a loan repayment. However, where the
payor pays the purchase price for land and title is taken in another's name
because of some fraudulent or otherwise unlawful purpose on the part of
the payor, equity courts will often refuse to enforce an otherwise clearly
enforceable resulting trust.200 Courts tend to apply the same standards to
the purchase-money resulting trust situation in this respect as they do
where a person transfers land on express trust to a third party with a
fraudulent or unlawful purpose. 20 1 In either case, the court may refuse to
require the grantee to relinquish title to the real estate, even though the
grantee is often party to the trust claimant's illegal purposes. These express
trust cases as well as purchase-money resulting trust cases are helpful in
considering the Missouri approach to the above problems.
The most common situation raising the clean hands problem is created
by the allegation that the payor had title taken by another for the purpose
of defrauding his creditors. The Missouri cases in this respect are often
confusing. Some say that no relief should be granted where the payor acted
at the time of conveyance with the purpose of defrauding his creditors, 202
while others indicate that relief should be denied only where it can be
established that harm has actually occurred to creditors. 20 3 A few early
199. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEE. § 463 at 634 (2d ed.
1964). A few states have statutes providing that a conveyance of the purchase-
money resulting trust type is presumed fraudulent against creditors. See statutes
in notes 258 and 263 sitpra.
200. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 463 at 634 (2nd ed.
1964).
201. Ibid.
202. E.g., Keener v. Williams, 307 Mo. 682, 706, 271 S.W. 489, 496 (1925);
Sell v. West, 125 Mo. 621, 628, 28 S.W. 969, 970 (1894); Gammage v. Latham,
222 S.W. 469, 471 (Mo. 1920); Rowley v. Rowley, 197 S.W. 152, 156 (Mo. 1917);
Cape County Say. Bank v. Wilson, 225 Mo. App. 14, 25, 34 S.W.2d 981, 984 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1931).
203. E.g., Stephenson v. Stephenson, 351 Mo. 8, 171 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1943).
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cases in the first category contain the language that "a resulting trust can
not arise or spring into being when the transactions on which the supposed
trust is bottomed, appear to have had their origin in any fraudulent
purpose." 20 4 In these cases, there is usually no delineation as to whether
creditors were actually injured; rather the courts focus primarily on the
intent of the original payor. Equally confusing about this category of cases
is the fact that the courts assume that the payor's fraudulent purpose pre-
vents the creation of a trust rather than the enforcement of the trust. It
would appear to be inaccurate to say that no trust results in such a situa-
tion because the existing or subsequent creditors of the payor or a wife de-
frauded of her marital rights should be able to have the benefit of a resulting
trust even though the wrongdoer and his successors should not have the
benefit thereof. In fact, the "no trust" approach was rejected in later
cases.20 5 In Cape County Sav. Bank v. Wilson, 2°6 for example, a creditor
was seeking to enforce a purchase-money resulting trust in real estate in
favor of the debtor-payor and one of the defenses was that since the payor
had taken title in order to defraud his wife of her marital rights, a resulting
trust could not arise. The St. Louis Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that even though a trust could not be declared in favor of the payor, a trust
could result to him in favor of his creditors, existing and subsequent.=207
Stephenson v. Stephenson20 s falls within the category of cases which
consider whether harm has actually resulted to creditors. In that case a
makeshift written trust of real estate was set up by the plaintiff to avoid
claims of creditors, pursuant to which real estate was transferred to plain-
tiff's mother-in-law. Upon the mother-in-law's death, the latter's heirs re-
fused to reconvey the real estate to the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued to establish
a trust. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected a clean hands defense based
on plaintiff's fraudulent intent because it was established that all of plain-
tiff's creditors had apparently been paid and thus had suffered no harm.
Admittedly, the Stephenson case involves an express and not a resulting
204. Sell v. West, 125 Mo. 621, 628, 28 S.W. 969, 970 (1894) (emphasis added).
See also Keener v. Williams, 307 Mo. 682, 692, 271 S.W. 489, 496 (1925).
205. See LaRue v. LaRue, 294 S.W. 723, 726 (Mo. 1927); Cape County Say.
Bank v. Wilson, 225 Mo. App. 14, 25, 34 S.W.2d 981, 984 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
206. 225 Mo App. 14, 25, 34 S.W.2d 981, 984 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931).
207. Ibid. In any event, if a creditor can establish a fraudulent conveyance
under § 428.020, RSMo 1959, reliance on a resulting trust may be unnecessary.
This statute, however, is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Comment,
Fraudulent Conveyances-Element of Intent in Missouri, 25 U.K.C.L. REv. 104
(1957).
208. 351 Mo. 8, 171 S.W.2d 565 (1943).
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trust. It could be argued that, while more than fraudulent motive is neces-
sary in express trust situations, a more rigorous clean hands standard
should be applied where trusts are implied by law. However, because courts
tend to apply the same standards in both situations,20 9 the Missouri courts
apparently could require "actual harm" to creditors in resulting trust
situations.
Presumably, when a resulting trust is created without a fraudulent
purpose, the subsequent concealment of the trust by the beneficiary to
avoid creditors' claims should not prevent the beneficiary from enforcing it
against the grantee. 210 The Missouri decision in Abernathzy v. Hampe2 1'
casts some doubt on this assumption, however. In that case, the St. Louis
Court of Appeals appeared to sustain a clean hands defense to a claim for
resulting trust by plaintiff real estate broker in part because judgments
were rendered against the plaintiff while the real estate was concealed in a
trust. The court, however, may have felt that the subsequent concealment
of the trust from creditors was strong evidence that the original conveyances
were made with a fraudulent purpose. 12 In other words, the subsequent
fraudulent actions are related back to the original transaction.
The payor's conduct may prevent enforcement of a resulting trust for
his or his successor's benefit in cases which do not involve fraud on credi-
tors. Courts have refused to enforce resulting trusts where the payor was
involved in an effort to defeat statutes governing homesteading of govern-
ment land, to assist in carrying on an illegitimate business, to serve illicit
sexual relations and to avoid restrictions on alien land holding.213 In Miner v.
Davis,214 for example, an early Missouri case, a father purchased govern-
ment land in the name of the defendant, his son, because under federal
statutes, the father had already purchased the maximum legally permitted.
The father sold his interest to plaintiff and plaintiff sued for the imposition
of a purchase-money resulting trust in his favor. The Missouri Supereme
Court held that because the father's act in so purchasing the land in the
name of his son violated public policy, no trust would be imposed for
plaintiff's benefit.
209. See text at note 201 supra.
210. 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 444 at 3354 (3rd ed. 1967).
211. 53 S.W.2d 1090 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932).
212. 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 444 at 3354 (3rd ed. 1967).
213. G. G. and G. T. BoGaER, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 463 at 640-641 (2d ed.
1964).
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The basic problem with the clean hands defense is the absence of
workable standards for predictable application. Courts not only consider
the payor's illegal or fraudulent conduct but also the degree of involvement
and culpability of the grantee.215 It seems illogical to permit one guilty
party to retain property paid for by another guilty party. Courts are prob-
ably unwilling to permit unjust enrichment of an obviously guilty party
because of the payor's misconduct. The courts, when reiterating the clean
hands maxim or the doctrine of nonenforceability of agreements that are
against public policy, must not fail to recognize that such cases involve a
delicate balancing process. Professor Scott and the Restatement of Trusts
implicitly recognize the inadequacy of the traditional formulas by con-
cluding that the question in each case should be whether the policy against
unjust enrichment of the grantee is "out-weighed by the policy against
giving relief to the payor who has entered into an illegal transaction."216
Thus in each situation the court should be able to consider openly several
subjective factors, such as the extent to which creditors were harmed, the
amount of the enrichment of the grantee if relief is not given, and the
relative wealth of the payor and the grantee. For example, a court may
determine that a payor's prior attempt to defraud creditors should not be
controlling where the payor is financially embarrassed and the grantee, on
the other hand, is wealthy. In that case, perhaps the policy against unjust
enrichment should prevail over the policy in favor of deterring defrauding of
creditors. The Restatement rule openly recognizes a balancing approach
and it seems to be desirable because it delineates in simpler terms what
the courts have actually been doing while ostensibly following the tradi-
tional clean hands concept and related doctrines.
VII. RELATIONSHIP OF PURcHASE-MONEY RESULTING TRUSTS
TO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
Certain fact situations are susceptible not only to possible application of
purchase-money resulting trust theory, but to constructive trust concepts
as well. The two theories are especially pertinent where the party paying
the purchase price and the grantee agree orally that the grantee is to hold
the title for the benefit of a third party. In order to understand the rather
complex nature of the above and related fact situations, it is necessary to
215. E.g., Sines v. Shipes, 192 Md. 139, 63 A.2d 748 (1949).
216. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 444 (1959); See 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS
§ 444 at 5349 (3rd ed. 1967).
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examine briefly the nature of the constructive trust and its relationship to
the purchase-money resulting trust.
Purchase-money resulting trusts, as we have seen, arise because the
circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the parties raise a pre-
sumption that the payor intended to make the grantee a trustee rather than
a beneficial owner of the conveyed property. 17 In other words, courts are
enforcing the payor's presumed intent. On the other hand, a constructive
trust will be imposed where a person holding title to property is under a
duty to convey it to another in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of
the title-holder.218 The constructive trust does not depend on the presumed
intention of the parties whereas the purchase-money resulting trust is in-
tent-enforcing. 21
The basic distinction between the purchase-money resulting trust and
the constructive trust is best explained by an analysis of the essential ele-
ments of the purchase-money resulting trust. If A's money is used to pur-
chase property in B's name with A's consent, or if A directs in such a situa-
tion that title be taken in B's name, the law imposes a presumption of re-
sulting trust because it is presumed that A's intent was that B have the
legal title, but not the beneficial interest in the property.220 In other words,
it is not B's actual acquisition of legal title that was wrongful, but rather
his retention thereof. On the other hand, where the facts establish that A
did not consent to the use of his money in the purchase or did not consent
to the conveyance to B, the remedy technically is the imposition of a con-
structive trust-that is, he is permitted to follow his money into the land. 21
The theory behind the constructive trust is not that A intended that B have
the legal but not the beneficial interest in the land, but rather that B
has wrongfu ly acquired the legal title to the land and that B would be un-
justly enriched if he is permitted to retain it.
One type of constructive trust situation highly relevant to the analysis
of this section is the absolute conveyance of land on oral trust for the
grantor or a third party beneficiary. Under the rule in effect in England and
followed in a minority of American cases, courts will impose a constructive
217. See text at note 15 supra.
218. 5 A. ScoTT, TRusTs § 440.1 at 3315 (3rd ed. 1967).
219. Ibid. See Suhre v. Busch, 123 S.W.2d 8, 15 (Mo. 1938).
220. 5 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 440.1 at 3316 (3rd ed. 1967).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECON) OF TRUSTS § 440 Introductory Note (1959). A
constructive trust in this context may also arise "where a person in a fiduciary
relation to another uses his own money in purchasing property in his own name if
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trust in favor of a grantor who conveyed land upon an oral trust in favor
of the grantor or pursuant to an oral contract with the grantee to reconvey
to the grantor, notwithstanding the reliance by the recalcitrant grantee on
the Statute of Frauds.2 2 However, the large majority of American cases do
not impose a constructive trust in the above situation unless (1) The trans-
fer was obtained by fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake; (2) The
grantee was at the time of the transfer in a confidential relation to the
grantor; or (3) The transfer was made as security for an indebtedness of
the grantor.223 Although there are a few early Missouri cases seemingly fol-
lowing the English rule,224 most recent Missouri authority appears to ac-
cept the majority American rule.225 Where the intended beneficiary of the
oral trust or agreement is a third party the approach of most courts is simi-
222. E.g., Bannister v. Bannister, [19483 2 All E.R. 133; Steinberger v. Stein-
berger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 140 P.2d 31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Eastmond v.
Eastmond, 2 NJ. Super. 532, 64 A.2d 901 (Ch. Div. 1949); 1 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 44
at 325-327 (3rd ed. 1967). Of course, those jurisdictions in which Section 16 of the
Uniform Trust Act is in effect must be included within the minority rule. See Uni-
form Trust Act § 16 (1937). These jurisdictions are in New Mexico, North Carolina,
South Dakota and the Virgin Islands. See 9C Uniform Laws Annot. 192 (1967
Supp.). For a general discussion of the absolute conveyance-oral trust doctrine, see
Comments, 1 CREIGHTON L. REv. 95 (1968).
223. Fratcher, Trusts and Succession, 22 Mo. L. REv. 390, 412 (1957). See
e.g., Musser v. General Realty Co., 313 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1958) (fraud); Basman v.
Frank, 250 S.W.2d 989 (Mo. 1952) (confidential relationship). It has been sug-
gested that the trend in the American authority is toward the English rule. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 44, comment a (1959).
224. See Peacock v. Nelson, 50 Mo. 256 (1872); O'Day v. Annex Realty Co.,
191 S.W. 41 (Mo. 1917). O'Day contains the following statement: "Where a
grantee takes possession of real estate under a deed, absolute in its terms, under
a parol agreement, whereby he undertakes to hold the property for some legiti-
mate purpose, or to sell and account for the proceeds, or to reconvey it to the
grantor, his refusal to perform his promise amounts to a constructive fraud, and
he will be held to be a trustee for the grantor or his heirs." ODay v. Annex Realty
Co., 191 S.W. 41, 48 (Mo. 1917).
225. See, e.g., Beach v. Beach, 207 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1947); Parker v. Blakeley,
338 Mo. 1189, 93 S.W.2d 981 (1936). The Parker court practically overrules the
language of the O'Day case quoted in note 224 supra with the following comment:
"It [the language of O'Day] might be dismissed as surplusage or dictum, but we
deem it advisable to point out that it does not accurately state the prevailing rule
in this jurisdiction." Parker v. Blakeley, 338 Mo. 1189, 1205, 93 S.W.2d 981, 990
(1936). The Beach case states: "Fraud, either actual or constructive, was an es-
sential element of the alleged constructive trust ... The simple violation, however,
of a parol contract does not give rise to a constructive trust for, if such was the
law, the statute of frauds would be virtually repealed." Beach v. Beach, 207 S.W.2d
481, 486 (Mo. 1947). The latter language does not in any way conflict with
Parker because Parker, as we have seen, rejected the O'Day language which would
have equated a refusal to carry out an oral trust for the grantor with constructive
fraud. See Schultz v. Curson, 421 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Mo. 1967), where mere breach
of an oral agreement, without more was not sufficient to impose a constructive
trust on grantee; Karnopp v. Karnopp, 387 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo. 1965). But see
Suhre v. Busch, 343 Mo. 679, 696-697, 123 S.W.2d 8, 16-17 (1938) (dicta).
1968]
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
lar to that described above. Under the majority approach, the Statute of
Frauds prevents the enforcement of the oral trust or the imposition of a
constructive trust.228 However, a few courts have imposed a constructive
trust in favor of the grantor where the grantee refuses to perform, notwith-
standing the Statute of Frauds227 and the same result is reached in those
states following Section 16 of the Uniform Trusts Act.228 Under the majority
approach the grantee will be allowed to retain the land,229 but the courts
will nevertheless impose a constructive trust in favor of the third party if
the grantee is guilty of fraud, duress, or undue influence or if a confidential
relationship or contemplation of death is involved. 230 Although there is
some confusion, Missouri appears to follow the majority approach. 231
With this brief background in certain areas of constructive trusts we
should return to the following hypothetical: Suppose A supplies the pur-
chase money for land and directs that title is to be taken in the name of
B, the latter agreeing orally to hold in trust for or to convey to C, A's in-
tended beneficiary.232 This situation differs from that in the preceding
paragraph in that in the former situation the settlor of the trust was the
grantor, whereas in the instant situation the settlor simply pays the pur-
chase price without ever having had title to the land. Presumably C could
not enforce the oral agreement because to do so would violate the Statute
of Frauds. 23 On the other hand, C should not be granted a purchase-
money resulting trust because C did not supply the purchase money.234
226. See, e.g., Jones v. Gachot, 217 Ark. 462, 230 S.W.2d 937 (1950); Ampuero
v. Luce, 68 Cal. App. 2d 811, 157 P.2d 899 (1945); Levy v. Seadler, 272 Pa.
366, 116 At. 294 (1922); 1 A. ScoTrr, TRusTs § 45 at 351 (3rd ed. 1967), and
cases cited therein.
227. See, e.g., Androscoggin County Savings Bank v. Tracy, 115 Me. 433, 99'
At. 257 (1916); Androski v. Thurber, 136 Cal. App. 2d 471, 288 P.2d 898 (1955).
9C Uniform Laws Annot. 290 (1957).
228. Uniform Trusts Act § 16 (1937). See note 222 supra.
229. See 9C Uniform Laws Annot. 290 (1957).
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 45, comments a and b (1959).
231. See Mugan v. Wheeler, 241 Mo. 376, 145 S.W. 462 (1912); Thomson v.
Thomson, 211 S.W. 52 (Mo. 1919); Wolfskill v. Wells, 154 Mo. App. 302, 134
S.W. 51 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Janssen v. Christian, 57 S.W.2d 692 (St. L. Mo. App.
1933), involving fraud and contemplation of death. But see Suhre v. Busch, 123
S.W.2d 8, 16-17 (Mo. 1938).
232. 5 A. ScoTr, TRusTs § 453 at 3365 (3rd ed. 1967).
233. Id. at 3336.
234. Professor Scott implicitly criticizes the Missouri Supreme Court decision
in Lewis v. Lewis, 225 S.W. 974 (Mo. 1920) because a resulting trust was im-
posed in favor of a third party beneficiary. See 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 453 at 3368
(3rd ed. 1967). This interpretation of the case may be subject to some question.
Actually the court determined that the supposed third party oral trust beneficiary
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Moreover, a constructive trust in favor of C seems illogical since B is not
enriched at C's expense.P 5
Persuasive arguments, however, are available to support granting
relief for the benefit of A. Perhaps a constructive trust for A's benefit
should be imposed to prevent B's enrichment at A's expense. In addition,
as a general rule, where an express trust fails for reasons other than the
Statute of Frauds, and consideration for the transfer is paid by a party
not the transferor, a resulting trust will be imposed in favor of the per-
son paying the consideration.23 6 Consequently, it would also seem proper
to decree a resulting trust where the failure of the express trust is tied to
the Statute of Frauds. The most compelling argument, however, can be
advancd in favor of a purchase-money resulting trust in favor of A. The
essential elements of a purchase-money resulting trust are present in that A
has paid the purchase price and has directed that title be taken in the
name of B. As we have noted earlier, B would not be permitted to rely on
the existence of an unenforceable oral agreement to hold on trust for A
to defeat the presumption of resulting trust created because of A's other
acts. 2 7 B should similarly be prevented from utilizing such an oral agree-
ment where the intended beneficiary is a third party, notwithstanding the
fact that, in the latter situation, the oral agreement negates rather than
supports a presumption that A should have the beneficial interest in the
land. B should simply be prohibited from utilizing the unenforceable oral
agreement to hold in trust in any way to enable himself to retain the
land as against A, the payor. Simply stated, as to A, courts arguably should
ignore the oral agreement and otherwise apply normal purchase-money re-
sulting trust principles.
I There is dictum lending some support to the latter argument above in
the Missouri case of Bender v. Bender.23s In that case, the petition alleged
that a husband provided the purchase price for real estate and had
title taken jointly with his wife subject to an agreement that in the event
advanced by her father as a gift to her. The court also noted that without her
consent her name was omitted as a grantee and that she continuously thereafter
assumed that her name so appeared. Thus, the case would appear to call for a
constructive trust because the daughter's money was used to purchase the land;
however, there was no consent on her part to the conveyance to the actual grantee.
See text at note 221 supra. Although the court erroneously labeled the trust "re-
suiting" the result in the case seems perfectly justifiable.
235. 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 453 at 3366 (3rd ed. 1967).
236. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 424 at 3273 (3rd ed. 1967).
237. See text at notes 16 through 21 supra.
238. 281 Mo. 473, 202 S.W. 929 (1920).
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of a divorce the wife would hold her interest in the property as trustee
for his children. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to find a resulting
trust of any kind because of the presumption of gift to the wife. 23 9 How-
ever, the court did indicate that if the title had been taken jointly and
the parties had been strangers, "a trust would result in the payor's favor
for the half interest held in the name of the other joint tenant. '240 Implicit
in such dicta is the recognition that although the children would not be
entitled to relief, because to grant such relief would in effect enforce an
invalid oral agreement, the presence of such an agreement should not
prevent ordinary purchase-money resulting principles from applying to A,
the payor.
Interestingly, Professor Scott suggests that if B is guilty of fraud
in persuading A to make the conveyance or if A and B were in a confidential
relationship with each other, C should be entitled to the land.241 He appears
to rely on the majority rule which entitles a third party beneficiary to a
constructive trust in certain cases where there has been a breach of an
oral trust or agreement to reconvey.2 42 This reliance, of course, is probably
by analogy only, because the majority rule as well as the language of
section 45 of the Restatement of Trusts and section 183 of the Restatement
of Restitution dealing therewith each specifies that the settlor actually have
transferred an interest in land.243 Such rules, of course, do not literally
apply where the settlor simply supplies the purchase money because he
technically is not a transferor of real estate. In any event, this anomaly
should not prevent such concepts from being applied by analogy to the
purchase money situation. Moreover, it may be advisable to include within
the rules in the Restatements the settlor who simply pays the purchase
price, as well as the grantor-settlor who actually conveys an interest in
real estate.
Another important fact situation raising both constructive trust and
239. See text at notes 76 through 77 supra.
240. Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 473, 474, 220 S.W. 929, 930 (1920).
241. 5 A. Scoar, TRUSTS § 453 at 3367 (3rd ed. 1967).
242. See text at notes 229 through 230 supra.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 45 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF RESTI-
TUTION § 183 (1937). RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrTUTION §§ 163-179 (1937), dealing
with mistake, fraud, duress and undue influence, seems inapplicable to the instant
situation because it appears to assume a transferor who has a greater interest in
the transaction than simply to receive the purchase price. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 133 (1937). The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated, however,
that RESTATEMENT OF RESTIrUoN § 182(a) (1939) may be applicable in a confi-
dential relationship situation where A pays the purchase price and has B take
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purchase-money resulting trust implications is as follows: A owns an interest
in land which is about to be sold by a mortgage foreclosure sale or by
some type of judicial sale. B promises A orally that B will buy in at the
sale and B also agrees orally to reconvey the land to A upon A's payment.
Accordingly A takes no action to prevent the sale and does not bid in
thereon. Thereafter B purchases the land at the sale and refuses to reconvey
to A.244
Under the prevailing rule in this country a constructive trust will be
imposed on the land in favor of A subject to A's reimbursement of B for
payments made by B, and A will not be required to establish that B never
intended to carry out his promise or was guilty of fraud or that there was
a fiduciary relationship or confidential relationship between the parties 245
The important requirement under the above position is that B's promise
actually, induced A to forego steps to take part in the sale or otherwise.
protect his position. A few states, however, have held that a constructive
trust is unavailable unless there is a showing of fraud or of a confidential
relationship.246
Missouri has, to some extent, experimented with both positions, al-
though more recent authority indicates that Missouri has adopted the
majority approach. For example, in Gates Hotel Co. v. CRH Davis Real
Estate Co.,247 the Missouri Supreme Court stated that in an oral trust
of the kind discussed above "fraud must be distinctly alleged and clearly
proved."248 Yet cases both prior to and after Gates indicate that proof of
fraud is unnecessary so long as it can be shown that the owner in reliance
on the promise of the purchaser did not take steps to protect his property
interest. 249 The relatively recent case of Swon v. Huddlesto2 50 clearly re-
establishes Missouri within the majority rule. In that case, the Missouri
Supreme Court cited the majority rule with approval and rather ingeniously
distinguished the Gates case. According to Swon, "circumstances showing
that the oral promise actually induced the beneficial owner ...from pro-
tecting . ..the property, and that bidding was actually 'chilled' and sup-
244. 1 A. ScoiT, TRuSTs § 44.4 at 344 (3rd ed. 1967).
245. Id. at 345.
246. Id. at 346.
247. 331 Mo. 94, 52 S.W.2d 1011 (1932).
248. Id. at 104, 52 S.W.2d at 1014. See also Gates Hotel Co. v. Federal Inv. Co.,
331 Mo. 107, 52 S.W.2d 1016 (1932).
249. See, e.g., Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955); Laughlin v.
Laughlin, 291 Mo. 472, 237 S.W. 1024 (1922).
250. 282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955).
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pressed, to the distinct financial advantage of the defendant"251 could con-
stitute "constructive fraud." Thus, in the latter sense, fraud could be
"distinctly alleged and clearly proven." Swon also indirectly points out
what must be implicit in the majority rule that the beneficial owner actually
have had the ability to protect the property in absence of reliance on the
oral promise of the actual purchaser 252
A slight change in the basic fact situation discussed above creates
purchase-money resulting trust as well as constructive trust implications.
Suppose that B bids in at the sale and pays the purchase price as a loan
to A. In effect the situation is identical to that previously discussed where
a grantee advances the purchase price of land and takes title thereto as
security for the repayment of the purchase price.253 In the instant situation,
of course, A at the time of the sale actually owns the real estate whereas in
the normal case neither of the parties have a prior interest therein. However,
the principle of a purchase-money resulting trust presumably is equally
applicable in the forced sale situation.254 Of course, as in the constructive
trust situation, the imposition of the purchase-money resulting trust
would be subject to reimbursement of the grantee for the amount he paid
on the purchase price.
VIII. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The purchase-money resulting trust concept has not been free of
criticism. Some courts have regarded such trusts as possible instruments
of fraud and perjury by which rightful owners are deprived of their
property.2 ,5 Another objection has been that purchase-money resulting
trusts result in upsetting formal documents and thus make title to
land uncertain. 2 0 Moreover, it has been argued that fraud on creditors is
encouraged by such trusts because creditors of the grantee are deceived
with respect to the grantee's assets and the creditors of the payor are
similarly misled with respect to the payor's assets. 5 7
In fact, statutes in Kentucky, Michigan, Minesota, New York, and
251. Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 27 (Mo. 1955).
252. Ibid.
253. See text at notes 123 through 125 supra.
254. 1 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 44.4 at 349 (3rd. ed. 1967).
255. G. G. and G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 452 at 505 (2d ed. 1964);
Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 582, 590 (1815).
256. See note 255 supra.
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Wisconsin have abolished the purchase-money resulting trust.258 Such
statutes are very similar because they have a common origin in the statute
adopted by New York in 1830.259 In general they provide that in the usual
purchase-money resulting trust situation, no trust or use shall be declared
for the payor unless (1) the grantee takes title in his own name without
consent of the payor or (2) the grantee in violation of some trust pur-
chases the land with the money or property of another.260 Moreover, there
is a presumption that such purchase-money conveyances are fraudulent
against the creditors of the payor and unless the fraudulent intent is dis-
proved, a trust shall result in favor of such creditors to the extent neces-
sary to satisfy their demands. 261 The two exceptions, of course, involve the
wrongful acquisition of legal title and, as we have noted previously, call
for the imposition of a constructive rather than a resulting trust.20 2
Indiana and Kansas have similar provisions abolishing purchase-
money resulting trusts,2es but these statutes are inapplicable where it can
be established that, absent any fraudulent intent, there is an agreement
that the grantee hold the land in trust for the payor. 264 Such agreements
need not be written. 265 Since in most cases there is some type of agreement
present in addition to the elements creating the resulting trust presump-
tion, it would appear that the Indiana and Kansas statutes are really
not serious limitations on the creation of purchase-money resulting trusts.
Essentially, these statutes simply do away with the presumption of resulting
trust and put the burden on the trust claimant to establish the trust intent.266
In those states with statutes similar to that of New York, the simple
fact of payment of the purchase price for a conveyance to another gives
the payor no trust claim with respect to the property. Moreover, some
cases have reached the same result notwithstanding the fact that the
258. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.170 (1962); Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.57-26.59
(1957); MINN. STAT. §§ 501.07-501.09 (1965); N. Y. ESTATES, PowERs AND TRusTs
LAw § 7-1.3 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 231.07-231.09 (1957); 5 A. Sco-rr, TRusTs§ 4402 at 3317 (3rd ed. 1967). Four other states expressly permit purchase-money
resulting trusts. See note 3 supra.
259. 5 A. Scorr, TRusTs § 440.2 at 3318 (3rd ed. 1967).
260. Id. at 3317-3318.
261. Id. at 3318.
262. See text at note 221 supra.
263. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-606-56-608 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2406-58-
2408 (1964).
264. I3N. ANN. STAT. § 56-608 (1962); KA. STAT. ANN. § 58-2408 (1964).
265. See Hadley v. Kays, 121 Ind. App. 112, 98 N.E.2d 237 (1951); Taylor
v. Walker, 114 Kan. 614, 220 P. 518 (1923); Gossage, Constructive and Resulting
Trusts in Kansas, 24 J. KAN. B. AssN. 104, 108 (1955).
266. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 440.2 at 3318 (3rd ed. 1967).
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grantee orally agreed to hold the property in trust. 267 Many other cases,
however, have imposed a constructive trust where there has been an oral
trust agreement, 26 8 although most of these cases have also relied on an
element of fraud,20 9 of confidential relationship between the grantee and
payor,270 or of part performance in reliance on an oral trust by the payor.2
71
A very interesting case in this regard is the early Michigan case of Linsley
v. Sinclar.2 7 2 In that case, plaintiff had previously hired the defendant
as an attorney to clear up title to certain land plaintiff had purchased.
Defendant for two years bid in at tax sales as agent for the plaintiff.
Defendant then suggested that it would make the title stronger if defendant
would take title in his own name from the tax sales and later deed the
land over to the plaintiff. Plaintiff consented and supplied the considera-
tion for such purchases. Defendant, however, refused to reconvey to plain-
tiff and the latter sought a constructive trust against the defendant. Not-
withstanding the Michigan statute discussed above, the Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court decree in plaintiff's favor on the grounds
that "a conveyance obtained by fraud can never be accepted as a shield
of defence against the equitable claim of the party defrauded. 2 73 Appar-
ently the court considered the defendant guilty of fraud because he never
intended to carry out his promise to reconvey.
Finally, it should be pointed out that none of the statutes prevent
the payor from getting relief when the transaction is a combination of
resulting trust and oral mortgage in favor of the grantee. In those situa-
tions, the courts simply permit the payor to establish the mortgage even
though the statute would preclude reliance on a resulting trust.27 4
An analysis of the objections to purchase-money resulting trusts and
of the experience in those jurisdictions having statutes prohibiting such
trusts indicates that it is unwise to replace or modify the traditional
purchase-money resulting trust doctrine applied by Missouri and the
vast majority of American jurisdictions. As noted, in many instances juris-
267. See cases noted in 5 A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 440.2 at 3320, note 9 (3rd ed.
1967).
268. See cases noted in 5 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 440. at 3320, note 8 (3rd
ed. 1967).
269. E.g., Linsley v. Sinclair, 24 Mich. 380 (1872).
270. E.g., Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N.Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929).
271. E.g., Muller v. Sobol, 277 App. Div. 884, 97 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1950). See
5 A. Scorr, TRusTs § 440.2 at 3321 (3rd ed. 1967).
272. 24 Mich. 380 (1872).
273. Id. at 382.
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dictions governed by statutes abolishing purchase-money resulting trusts
reach essentially the same result as those jurisdictions applying the tradi-
tional resulting trust doctrine. Moreover, strong countervailing arguments
seem to neutralize the traditional objections referred to earlier in this
section. While it may be true that the purchase-money resulting trust doc-
trine to some extent encourages fraud and perjury, resulting trust cases
will almost always be tried to a chancellor who probably is much less
likely than a jury to be swayed by questionable testimony. In addition, the
trust claimant has the burden to establish the essential elements of the
presumption by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence to exclude all
reasonable doubt from the mind of the court."2 75 While the purchase-money
resulting trust does in a sense render formal title documents uncertain,
such uncertainty is also caused by numerous other doctrines and remedies,
of which the constructive trust and equitable lien are suitable examples.
The trust claimant's rigorous burden of proof with respect to the essential
elements of the presumption aids the creditors of the grantee, and the
creditors may also in certain instances receive the benefit of an estoppel
theory.27 6 Moreover, payor's creditors may be protected by the Fraudulent
Conveyances Act,2 7 7 and the clean hands doctrine may also deter the
payor from attempting to deceive his creditors 278 Perhaps the best argu-
ment in favor of the purchase-money resulting trust is simply that it
is unfair to permit an undeserving grantee to retain the property as against
the party paying the purchase price who is otherwise not guilty of miscon-
duct.
Professor Scott has suggested that it may be reasonable to abolish
the presumption that a trust is intended merely because the purchase
price is paid by one and the title is taken in the name of another, in
favor of simply putting the burden on the trust claimant to establish that
a trust was intended 2 7 9 Although such an approach ostensibly would place
a heavier burden on the trust claimant, it is difficult to predict whether it
would substantially change the results obtained under the traditional doc-
trine. In any event, the traditional doctrine appears to have worked fairly
well, and on balance there is little need to disturb rather well-settled pur-
chase-money resulting trust principles.
275. See note 9 supra.
276. McMullin, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts in Missouri, 6 Mo. L. Rv.
354, 359 (1941). See text at note 6 supra.
277. See note 207 supra.
278. See text at notes 199 through 216 supra.
279. 5 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 440.4 at 3325 (3rd ed. 1967).
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